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STATE ACTION AND MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST
IMMUNITY: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
JOHN E. LOPATKA*
INTRODUCTION
'ROM their inception, the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
X private firms from restraining competition, so that consumers would
not be forced to pay monopoly prices.' It was therefore no surprise when,
in 1943, the Supreme Court held that state governments are immune
from antitrust attack even when their actions are anticompetitive.2
Whatever harm the state governments might do, it was not the kind of
harm against which the antitrust laws were directed. Surprise, however,
would not properly describe the reaction to the Supreme Court's 1978
decision that municipal governments are not similarly immune from an-
titrust challenge. Call it shock. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co.,' the Court held that while cities may acquire immunity from
the state, they do not enjoy immunity by virtue of their own status as
governments.5 Four years later, in Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder,6 the Court held that for a city to acquire antitrust immu-
nity, it is not enough that the state explicitly delegate broad powers of
home rule to that city. Rather, the state must at least authorize the spe-
cific municipal actions challenged.'
Few recent opinions of the Supreme Court, at least in the area of eco-
nomic regulation, have generated the controversy and activity produced
by these two decisions. In Senate and House Committee hearings on the
issue of municipal immunity,8 the witnesses have expressed widely diver-
gent views. One asserted that the possibility of antitrust liability has so
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A., 1974, Loyola, Chicago;
J.D., 1977, University of Chicago. I would like to thank Thomas S. Ulen, Laura A. Reyn-
olds, and Marie T. Reilly for their helpful comments on prior drafts of this Article. I am
also indebted to James J. Gettel for his valuable research assistance.
1. For general treatments of the legislative origins and early judicial interpretations
of the Sherman Act, see R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 15-
90 (1978); W. Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act (1965); H. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an
American Tradition (1954).
2. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
3. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
4. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
5. Id. at 413.
6. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
7. Id. at 52, 55, 57.
8. See Senate Committee Reviews Options for Legislation in Wake of Boulder, 46
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1162, at 813-14 (April 26, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Review]; House Judiciary Committee Reviews Legislative Options in Light
of Boulder, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1167, at 1062-63 (May 31, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as House Review].
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chilled municipal actions that his city has become "a frozen wasteland." 9
Another remarked that "mayors are sitting ducks .... Having the
threat of antitrust suits hanging over our heads is enough to bring gov-
ernment to a grinding halt."'" Still another lamented that cities "have
lost their power to control their destiny."" Another witness, however,
argued that cities "should be subject to the federal antitrust laws, just as
they are to federal laws on employment discrimination and interstate
commerce."'" Others advocated middle grounds between full antitrust
exposure and complete immunity.' 3 Bills were introduced in both houses
of Congress to change the doctrine created by the Supreme Court, and a
conference committee was ultimately able to win approval of the Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984." Scholarly response has been abun-
dant and diverse.' 5 Articles and editorials in the popular press relating to
the issue have become almost as common as reports of presidential news
9. House Review, supra note 8, at 1062 (statement of Fred L. Foreman, State's At-
torney of Lake County, Illinois).
10. Id. (statement of Kenneth A. Gibson, Mayor of Newark, New Jersey).
11. Senate Review, supra note 8, at 813 (statement of Joseph Riley, Mayor of Charles-
ton, South Carolina).
12. House Review, supra note 8, at 1062 (statement of Thomas J. Campbell, Stanford
University professor, former director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of
Competition).
13. Compare Boulder Bill Stirs Up Differing Perspectives From States, Localities, 46
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1159, at 688 (April 5, 1984) (statement of Ger-
ald L. Baliles, Virginia Attorney General) (advocating middle ground) and id. (statement
of Dick Hemstad, Washington State Senator) (same) with id. (statement of Donald Mur-
ray, Legislative Representative of the Nat'l Ass'n of Counties) (advocating equal immu-
nity for state and municipal governments) and id. at 689 (statement of William Hunter,
Attorney, Washington, D.C.) (opposing legislation to limit municipal liability).
14. The bill was signed into law by the President on Oct. 24, 1984. See 47 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 753 (Oct. 25, 1984). The Act essentially provides that no
antitrust damages may be recovered from a local government, or from a private party
based on an official act directed by local government. Id; see id. at 716-18 (Oct. 18,
1984).
15. See, e.g., Antitrust & Local Government (J. Siena ed. 1982); Areeda, Antitrust
Immunity for "State Action" after Lafayette, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 435 (1981); Brame &
Feller, The Immunity of Local Governments and Their Officials from Antitrust Claims
After City of Boulder, 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705 (1982); Cirace, An Economic Analysis of
the "State-Municipal Action" Antitrust cases, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 481 (1982); Civiletti, The
Fallout from Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: Prospects for a Legisla-
tive Solution, 32 Cath. U.L. Rev. 379 (1983); Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of
Federalism, 26 J. Law & Econ. 23 (1983); Robinson, The Sherman Act as a Home Rule
Charter: Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 2 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 131
(1983); Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a Federalist System, 1980 Ariz. St. L.J.
305 (1980); Sentell, The United States Supreme Court as Home Rule Wrecker, 34 Mercer
L. Rev. 363 (1982); Slater, Local Governments and State Action Immunity after City of
Lafayette and City of Boulder, 51 Antitrust L.J. 349 (1982); Stroll, Home Rule and the
Sherman Act After Boulder: Cities Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 49 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 259 (1983); Vanderstar, Liability of Municipalities Under the Antitrust Laws: Litiga-
tion Strategies, 32 Cath. U.L. Rev. 395 (1983); Note, The Preemption Alternative to Mu-
nicipalAntitrust Liability, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 145 (1982); Note, Antitrust: The Parker
Doctrine and Home Rule Municipalities, 22 Washburn L.J. 534 (1983); Note, Municipal
Government Exemption from Federal Antitrust Laws: An Examination of the Midcal Test
After Boulder, 40 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 143 (1983).
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conferences. 6 The Federal Trade Commission initially began to chal-
lenge municipal actions as unfair trade practices. 7 Subsequently, in the
1985 appropriations bill covering the FTC, Congress passed a rider that
barred the Commission from expending funds to enforce antitrust actions
against municipalities.' 8 It later repealed the rider.' 9
No doubt this controversy has been generated primarily by the real
impact that antitrust liability has had or is expected to have on the func-
tioning of local governments. Part of the response, though, stems from
an instinctive, somehow moral sense of indignation. To many people,
holding city governments liable for antitrust violations just seems wrong.
Perhaps instinctive reactions should not be often trusted, but in this case
we would do well to heed them. It may not be immoral, but the notion
of municipal antitrust liability is misguided.
The antitrust laws serve an economic objective.20 Consequently, any
assessment of the wisdom of applying these laws to cities must start with
an economic analysis of the impact of and alternatives to municipal anti-
trust liability. This kind of analysis requires an understanding of the eco-
nomic justifications for the actions of city governments. This Article
undertakes the analysis and demonstrates that of all the ways in which a
city may affect competition, only a fraction disserve the goal of the anti-
trust laws. Many other municipal actions that affect competition pro-
mote that goal, and still other actions promote other goals without
impairing the objective of the federal antitrust laws.
Even as to those actions that impair the federal objective, the antitrust
laws should be inapplicable. The nature of governmental actions makes it
almost impossible to distinguish between conduct that is harmful and
that which is not. Allowing the judiciary to impose liability invites error,
which in turn dissuades cities from engaging in activities that would in-
crease social welfare. More fundamentally, individuals organized into a
political entity ought to have the right to sacrifice the benefit of the anti-
trust laws for whatever reason, as long as they bear the cost. When they
do not bear the cost of their decisions, they should be restrained. But
that restraint should flow from federal and state legal requirements other
than the antitrust laws. Municipalities, as well as private parties ade-
quately authorized by them, should be absolutely immune from antitrust
liability. The Supreme Court could reach this result by reinterpreting
16. See Free Enterprise for Taxis, Chi. Tribune, May 14, 1984, at 10, col. 1 (midwest
ed.); Cities Facing Test Over Taxi Powers, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1984, at 25, col. 6.
17. See In re City of Minneapolis, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) C 22,149 (complaint
issued May 10, 1984); In re City of New Orleans, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) r 22,149(same).
18. The President signed the bill on August 30, 1984. See 47 Antitrust Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1181, at 439-40 (Sept. 13, 1984).
19. See 47 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 753 (Oct. 25, 1984); id. at 716 (Oct.
18, 1984).
20. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
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legislative intent. If it refuses to do so, however, the result should be
effected by congressional action.
In order to lay a necessary foundation for analyzing the issue of mu-
nicipal immunity, this Article begins with a discussion of the state action
doctrine,2 1 including the latest Supreme Court decision, Hoover v.
Ronwin,22 which has added significantly to the doctrine.23 The Supreme
Court's application of the state action doctrine to municipalities is then
described, and an analysis of a municipal antitrust case now pending
before the Court, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,24 follows.
A resolution is then proposed. The goal of the antitrust laws and the
ways in which a city might act in relation to this goal are discussed.25
The problem of extra-territorial impact of municipal decisions is specifi-
cally addressed.26 This Article argues that antitrust immunity is superior
to any attempt to assess liability discerningly,27 and that a doctrine of
blanket immunity is superior to a doctrine of immunity derived from
state governments.28 A description of the way in which absolute munici-
pal immunity would apply to private actors implementing municipal pol-
icies is then discussed.29 Finally, the merits of various alternative
approaches are addressed.3 °
I. THE CURRENT STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
In a 1943 case, Parker v. Brown,3 1 the Supreme Court held that the
State of California did not violate the Sherman Act by enacting legisla-
tion that, in effect, permitted raisin growers located in the state to fix
prices. At least, it may have so held. 32 Parker is the origin of the so-
called "state action doctrine," which over the years has managed to be-
come one of the more perplexing and confused doctrines in an area of
law boasting more than its fair share of uncertainty.3 3 The controversy
21. See infra pt. I.
22. 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
23. See infra notes 39-102 and accompanying text.
24. 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3508 (1984).
25. See infra notes 232-88 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 289-311 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 312-51 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 321-25 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 326-29 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 330-51 and accompanying text.
31. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
32. Id. at 352. For this view of the Parker holding see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579, 589 (1976) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
33. For a mere sampling of the scholarly commentary on the doctrine, see the mate-
rial cited in note 15, supra. See also I P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law 207-18
(1978) & I 212.1-2.7 (Supp. 1982); Burling, Lee & Quarles, "State Action" Antitrust
Immunity-A Doctrine in Search ofAntitrust Immunity-A Doctrine in Search of Defini-
tion, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 809 (1982); Morgan, Antitrust and State Regulation: Standards
of Immunity After Midcal, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 453 (1981); Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and
the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After
Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U.L. Rev. 1099 (1981); Posner, The Proper Relationship Be-
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engendered by Parker extends not only to the application of the doctrine
to new factual contexts,34 but also to the decision of the Court in the
Parker context itself. 5 Thus, even the very holding of Parker is
disputable.
Briefly put, the state action doctrine provides that conduct that would
otherwise violate the antitrust laws will not violate those laws if it is
either undertaken by a state or sufficiently authorized by it. 6 Since the
Parker decision, the Supreme Court has decided nine other state action
cases, the first in 195137 and the remaining eight since 1975.38 Rather
than trace the development of the doctrine historically, I propose to offer
an exposition of the doctrine as it exists today, following the latest
Supreme Court pronouncement in Hoover v. Ronwin.39 Of course, this
exposition will require some discussion of the earlier cases, in analytical
rather than chronological order. It will not address, however, the
Court's application of the state action doctrine to municipalities; the next
section of the Article pertains to that topic.
A. Conduct of the State
The plaintiff in Ronwin was an unsuccessful applicant for admission to
the Arizona Bar." Under the Arizona Constitution, the state supreme
court had the authority to determine who should be admitted to the
practice of law.4 Acting pursuant to that authority, the court promul-
gated rules providing, inter alia, for the appointment of a Committee on
Examinations and Admissions, consisting of seven Arizona attorneys se-
lected from a list supplied by the state bar association.42 The court re-
quired the Committee to examine applicants on subjects specified in the
tween State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 693 (1974);
Richards, Exploring the Far Reaches of the State Action Exemption: Implicationsfor Fed-
eralism, 57 St. John's L. Rev. 274 (1983).
34. See supra note 33; infra note 37.
35. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), discussed infra at notes
165-77 and accompanying text, where Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of the
Court, implied that the Parker doctrine protects only state officials. Cantor, 428 U.S. at
590-92. A majority of the Court, however, stated or implied that the doctrine protects
private parties as well. Id. at 605, 613 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
at 615-16 (Stewart, Powell, and Rhenquist, J.J., dissenting); see id. at 604 (Burger, CJ.,
concurring in part).
36. 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 211-12.
37. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
38. Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984); Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439
U.S. 96 (1978); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978);
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
39. 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
40. Id. at 1991.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1991-92 & n.4.
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rules.4 3 The Committee was authorized to "utilize such grading or scor-
ing system[s]"' as it deemed appropriate, though it was required to "file
with the [c]ourt thirty (30) days before each examination the proposed
formula for grading" the examination.45 The Committee was directed ul-
timately to "recommend to ... [the] court for admission to practice
applicants who are found by the [C]ommittee to have the necessary qual-
ifications and to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the rules of the
[state bar association's] board of governors as approved by this court re-
specting examinations and admissions."46 The Committee was specifi-
cally limited to recommending candidates for admission; under "the
Rules and Arizona case law, only the court had authority to admit or
deny admission."47 Further, an applicant was entitled to seek review, in
the supreme court, of an adverse recommendation by the Committee.48
Plaintiff Ronwin filed an action against the Committee members who did
not recommend his admission to the bar, alleging a violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act.49 In essence, he claimed that the Committee had set
the grading scale for his examination "with reference to the number of
new attorneys they thought desirable, rather than with reference to some
'suitable' level of competence,"5 thereby "artificially reducing the num-
bers of competing attorneys in the State of Arizona."51
In a 4-3 decision,52 the Supreme Court held that the bar examination
Committee was shielded from antitrust challenge by the Parker doc-
trine. 3 Ronwin sued four members of the bar examination committee,
not the Arizona Supreme Court. 4 At least since California Retail Li-
quor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. , the orthodoxy had
been that if private parties claimed antitrust immunity under the state
action doctrine, two conditions had to be met: "First, the challenged
restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as
state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State
itself."56 There is a possibility that a third condition has to be met as
well: that "anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of
43. Id. at 1992.
44. Id. at 1992 (quoting Rule 28(c) VIIA (1973) as amended, 110 Ariz. xxvii, xii
(1974)).
45. Id. at 1992 n.6.
46. Id. at 1992 n.4.
47. Id. at 1992.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1991 n.1, 1993-94. Section 1 of the Sherman Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982).
50. Id. at 1994.
51. Id. (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
52. Id. at 2003.
53. Id. at 1998.
54. Id. at 1991.
55. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).




the State acting as a sovereign." 57 This state compulsion requirement will
be discussed later.
In Ronwin, the Court acknowledged the Midcal test,"s but held that it
was not relevant in the case at hand because the conduct challenged was
really that of the Arizona Supreme Court, not the bar examination Com-
mittee.59 The Court said that "[w]here the conduct at issue is in fact that
of the state legislature or supreme court, [the court] need not address the
issues of 'clear articulation' and 'active supervision.' "I For purposes of
state action immunity, the Court defined the "state" as encompassing the
state legislature and the state supreme court "when acting in a legislative
capacity."6 It explicitly reserved the question of "whether the Governor
of a State stands in the same position as the state legislature and supreme
court ... *"62 The Court, citing Parker, held that the actions of a state
"ipso facto are exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws." 63
The dissent in Ronwin emphasized that Ronwin sued the individual
members of the bar examination Committee, and not the Arizona
Supreme Court." In reality, of course, the conduct that injured Ronwin
was "a blend of private and public decisionmaking." 65 In fact, Parker
itself involved a mixture of public and private decisionmaking. 6 Ronwin
alleged that the Committee, not the court, decided to base the number of
applicants recommended for admission to the bar on market conditions
rather than on professional competence.67 The court then accepted the
Committee's recommendations.6" The Supreme Court examined this
amalgam of activity and concluded that the operative act, for state action
purposes, was the court's acceptance of the Committee's recommenda-
tion and its consequent denial of Ronwin's application.69 The dissent ex-
amined the same amalgam and concluded that the operative act was the
Committee's decision to base its recommendation on competitive consid-
57. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
58. 104 S. Ct. at 1995.
59. Id. at 1998.
60. Id. at 1996.
61. Id. at 1995.
62. Id. at 1995 n.17.
63. Id. at 1995.
64. Id. at 2004-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592 (1976).
66. See id. at 592 n.25. In Parker, discussed infra at notes 106-10 and accompanying
text, the state enacted a statute that, in effect, permitted raisin growers to fix prices if the
agreement were authorized by a state agency. 317 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1943).
67. 104 S. Ct. at 1994.
68. Id. at 1992, 1997-98. There is some dispute as to whether the Arizona court ever
denied Ronwin's application. The Court appears to infer that since no one is admitted to
the bar unless the state court grants admission, and the court did not grant admission to
Ronwin, the court must have decided not to admit Ronwin. See id. at 1997-98, 2000
n.30. The inference seems reasonable. The dissent, however, remarks, "I find nothing in
the record to indicate that the court ever made such a decision." Id. at 2008 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
69. See id. at 1998.
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erations.7° This act was private conduct. The dissent's argument could be
interpreted as asserting that when the operative act is private, state ac-
tion immunity will apply only when the act is compelled by the state
acting as sovereign or when the act is taken pursuant to a clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed state policy.7' Here, the Committee's
alleged decision to base its recommendations on considerations of compe-
tition was neither compelled by the state supreme court nor consistent
with any clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. The
dissent, therefore, would have found that the Committee was not im-
mune from antitrust attack.72
1. Proximate Cause of Antitrust Injury: Public or Private Conduct
How can one determine whether an anticompetitive act that is the
product of both public and private decisionmaking will be deemed an act
of the state or an act of private parties? The Court appears to have
adopted the antitrust analog of the tort doctrine of proximate cause. 73 If
A dashes into the street to retrieve a baseball, prompting B to swerve to
avoid him but to slam into C's car in the process, both A's act and B's act
are causes in fact of C's injury. Generally, a "cause in fact" is any action,
omission, or condition which so far contributed to a result that the result
would not have occurred without it.74 The injury would not have oc-
curred if A had not run into the street or if B had stopped his car in time.
For that matter, C's Chevy would have been spared had D not smashed
the ball over the left fielder's head. Although each act is a cause in fact
of the injury, not every actor will be held legally responsible for that
injury. Instead, liability will be imposed only on that person or those
persons deemed to have proximately caused the injury.
Unfortunately, deciding where liability in the proximate cause analysis
will be cut off is not a precise determination. Rather, the result will be a
70. See id. at 2007-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. In Part II of his dissent, Justice Stevens states that " 'anticompetitive actions of a
state instrumentality not compelled by the State acting as sovereign are not immune from
the antitrust laws.'" Id. at 2007 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411 n.41 (1978)). He also states that immu-
nity was inapplicable here because the state supreme court did not "require" and did not
"direct" the Committee to act as they did. Id. In Part III, however, he states that the
applicable principle is that an anticompetitive restraint engaged in by a state instrumen-
tality "must be 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed' as state policy in order to
gain an antitrust exemption." Id. at 2009 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 n. 14 (1982) (quoting California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980))).
Whether Justice Stevens views state compulsion as synonymous with clear state policy is
uncertain, but they are not identical concepts. See infra notes 153-63 and accompanying
text. Because Justice Stevens found that there was neither state compulsion nor a clear
state policy, he did not have to reach the active state supervision requirement.
72. 104 S. Ct. at 2009-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Perhaps the best general description and analysis of the doctrine is contained in
W. Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 263-321 (5th ed. 1984).
74. Id. at 264-65. Courts often refer to this as "but for" causation. Id. at 265-66.
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product of "those more or less undefined considerations which limit lia-
bility even where the fact of causation is clearly established."" It is a
decision "associated with policy-with our more or less inadequately ex-
pressed ideas of what justice demands, or of [administrative possibility
and convenience]." 76
Likewise, for purposes of state action immunity, determining whether
a proximate cause of an antitrust injury is the act of the state, when acts
of both the state and the private parties are causes in fact, will depend
upon "more or less undefined considerations" and "inadequately ex-
pressed ideas of what justice demands." Such a principle is bound to dis-
tress those who crave a rigorous test that can be applied with
mathematical precision. Yet that appears to be the state of affairs. Some
guidance on the determinants of state action proximate cause can, how-
ever, be gleaned from the case law. Those factors that do not control are
discussed before those that may be relevant.
a. Factors That Appear Irrelevant to a Proximate Cause
Determination
First, the determination will not be left to the plaintiff. That is, the
Court will not attribute the restraint to the private actor simply because
the plaintiff names only the private actor as the defendant. In Ron win,
the plaintiff sued members of the bar examination Committee, not the
supreme court, but the Court had no trouble concluding that the "real
party in interest" was the Arizona Supreme Court.7 7
Second, the test for determining whether the state's act, rather than
the private act, is the proximate cause of the antitrust injury is not the
same as the test used to determine whether private conduct is sufficiently
authorized by the state to immunize the private actor under the state
action doctrine. In the latter case, the test at least includes the existence
of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy and active
state supervision;78 the Court in Ronwin, however, expressly stated that
those considerations were irrelevant to its decision.79 Indeed, if the Court
wishes to maintain a meaningful distinction between antitrust immunity
for private individuals based on the fact that the operative conduct is that
of the state, and such immunity based on the fact that the operative con-
duct is private but was sufficiently authorized by the state, the tests in the
two instances logically cannot be identical.
Third, the relevant private conduct need not be compelled by the state
75. Id. at 273.
76. Id. at 264.
77. 104 S. Ct. at 1999 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361
(1977)). In Bates, discussed infra at notes 111-16 and accompanying text, the plaintiffs
sued only the State Bar of Arizona, an agency of the state supreme court, and the Court
held the defendant immune under the Parker doctrine. Id. at 353 & n.3, 363.
78. See, eg., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54-56
(1982); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978).
79. 104 S. Ct. at 1996.
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
for the state conduct to be deemed a proximate cause. The alleged deci-
sion of the Committee in Ronwin to consider competition in making bar
admission recommendations was not compelled by the state court.80 Yet
the Supreme Court held that the proximate cause of the antitrust injury
was the conduct of the state court.81 This, of course, does not mean that
state compulsion is irrelevant to a proximate cause determination. In-
deed, one could argue that state compulsion is a sufficient, but not a nec-
essary condition for a finding that state conduct is the proximate cause of
an antitrust injury.82 Under this argument, whenever private conduct is
compelled by the state, the action that proximately caused the injury is
that of the state. When the private action is not compelled by the state,
the state's conduct may or may not be deemed the proximate cause.
Fourth, the fact that the private actors were designated by the legisla-
tive authority to act as state officials cannot be decisive and should not be
relevant. Language in Ronwin suggests that the Court believed that the
designation of examination Committee members as state officers was rel-
evant to a proximate cause determination,"3 and that it may have be-
lieved this to be decisive.84 To this extent, the opinion is misleading. The
Court's ruling on the state action issue is supportable without resort to
the status of the Committee. Other language in the opinion suggests that
the status is irrelevant,85 and the logic of the Court's position leads to the
same conclusion.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,6 the state bar, an administrative
agency of the state supreme court, enforced a minimum fee schedule
adopted by a county bar association. The Court held that the state bar
was not protected by the state action doctrine because the state supreme
court did not require the promulgation and enforcement of fee sched-
ules.8 7 The state court's rules were neutral toward, or at most prompted,
the conduct of the state bar, and that was insufficient for immunity.88
80. Id. at 2007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2002.
82. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
83. In explaining why the conduct challenged was that of the state, the Court noted,
"The petitioners here were each members of an official body selected and appointed by
the Arizona Supreme Court. Indeed, it is conceded that they were state officers." 104 S.
Ct. at 1997.
84. According to the Court, the dissent conceded that: first, the Arizona Supreme
Court exercises sovereign power with respect to bar admissions; second, the challenged
conduct, if it were that of the Court, would be immune under Parker; and third, the
members of the examination Committee are state officers. Id. at 1999. "These conces-
sions," the Court says, "dispose of Ronwin's contentions." Id. Thus, this language could
be interpreted to mean that because the Committee members were state officers, their
actions were those of the state.
85. See id. at 1999-2002 (the operative conduct was that of the state supreme court
and was thus immune under the state action doctrine).
86. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
87. Id. at 790.
88. Id. at 790-91.
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The designation of the state bar as an agency was not controlling. 9 As
the dissent in Ronwin pointed out, if the fact that the private actors par-
ticipating in a blend of public and private decisionmaking are state ad-
ministrative officers is sufficient to establish that the operative conduct is
that of the state, the Virginia Bar would have been immune in
Goldfarb.90
If the Court seriously believed that the designation of the Committee
members as state officers was determinative of the proximate cause issue,
and hence the ultimate issue of immunity, its decision could have been
much simpler. It could have cited the Arizona Supreme Court rule spec-
ifying the status of the Committee and found immunity. Instead, the
Court discussed several other factors bearing upon its finding of state
action.9' In fact, the Court at one point in the opinion suggested that
there was a single fact, unrelated to the status of the Committee, that
dictated the finding that the operative act was that of the state court:
Only the state court had authority actually to admit or deny admission.9
Further, the logic of the Court's position suggests that the status of
the private actors is irrelevant. When the issue to be determined is
whether a proximate cause of an antitrust injury is the conduct of the
state or of private parties, the analysis focuses on the relationship be-
tween the anticompetitive effect and the various causes in fact of that
effect. The question is: Which cause in fact is sufficiently predominant to
be deemed the legally responsible cause? The status of the private actor
as a public agent pertains to a different relationship--that between the
state and the private actor. Thus, the Ronwin Court said that if a state
legislature enacted an anticompetitive law based on advice given by an
advisory committee, the operative conduct would be that of the state,
and therefore, both the state and the committee would be protected by
the Parker doctrine.93 Surely the Court would reach the same result even
if the advice were given by a group of citizens with no official designation
and the law would not have been passed but for the advice.
b. Factors That Appear Relevant to a Proximate Cause Determination
Having outlined, then, what is not relevant in locating the proximate
cause of an anticompetitive effect, the question remains whether the
Court has indicated what factors may be relevant. In Roniwin, the Court
alluded to six factors: (1) the Arizona court appointed the members of
the Committee; (2) the court retained strict supervisory powers over the
Committee; (3) the court specified the general qualifications necessary for
admission to the bar, including the subjects to be tested on the bar exami-
nation; (4) the Committee was required to submit for court review the
89. Id. at 791.
90. Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 2007 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1997-98.
92. Id. at 2001.
93. Id. at 2001-02.
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grading formula that it intended to use; (5) the court itself made the final
decision to grant or deny admission to practice; and (6) an aggrieved
applicant had a right to obtain review by the court of an adverse recom-
mendation by the Committee.94 Of these factors, the first is clearly irrele-
vant to a determination of proximate cause, as discussed above. The
second appears irrelevant as well; although the presence or absence of
state supervision bears upon a finding that private conduct proximately
causing antitrust injury is sufficiently authorized by the state to acquire
state action immunity, the Court said that this issue was not presented in
Ronwin.95
The third factor is a red herring. The fact that the state court specified
the general qualifications necessary for admission simply has nothing to
do with the plaintiff's antitrust allegation. Ronwin claimed that he was
injured because the Committee set the number of recommended appli-
cants on the basis of competitive considerations,96 not because he was
tested on contracts and could not be a convicted rapist. In essence, this
factor is an aspect of the second factor, a kind of demonstration of the
court's supervision, and as discussed above, irrelevant.
The fourth factor could be relevant if the grading formula that had to
be filed with the court would have demonstrated that the Committee in-
tended to base its recommendations on market conditions, assuming that
the Committee intended to do so. But there is no evidence that the re-
quired submission had to be so detailed. Even if the Committee intended
to be influenced by competitive considerations in making its recommen-
dations, it is unlikely that the filed grading system would have disclosed
that fact.
This leaves the final two factors, both of which certainly are relevant.
If one views the injury sustained by Ronwin as the failure to be admitted
to the bar, it is reasonable to conclude that the proximate cause of that
injury is the denial of bar admission. Because only the state court had
authority to deny admission and final authority to review and overturn a
recommendation to deny admission,97 the legally responsible actor must
be the supreme court. Thus, the Court stated: "Th[e Arizona Supreme
Court] Rules carefully reserve to the court the authority to make the
decision to admit or deny, and that decision is the critical state action
here."98 It cannot be said, however, that whenever the state has ultimate
authority to allow or prevent an anticompetitive restraint, the state's act
or nonact is the proximate cause of the injury. The state will almost
always have that authority, and if that were enough for immunity, virtu-
ally all private conduct would be immune. For instance, the state court
94. Id. at 1997-98.
95. Id. at 1996. Although authorization may be relevant, supervision by itself is not.
96. Id. at 1993-94.
97. See id. at 2000-02.
98. Id. at 2001.
[Vol. 53
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
had the power to prohibit the use of fee schedules in Goldfarb." Never-
theless, that power was not sufficient to make the court the proximate
actor and thereby shield the state bar from antitrust attack.'°°
Of course, it would not be unreasonable to conclude, as the dissent did,
that the act critical to Ronwin's injury was the Committee's tainted rec-
ommendation.0l One could imagine that the Arizona Supreme Court
would accept whatever recommendations the Committee made. Com-
pared with the active nature of the Committee, the court's role would be
that of a relatively passive actor in the scenario, even though the court
had the power, in a legal sense, to reject the Committee's recommenda-
tions. So viewed, the proximate cause of Ronwin's injury could be the
Committee's conduct.
As the above discussion indicates, it is not easy to determine which
conduct will be deemed the proximate cause when an anticompetitive
restraint is the product of both public and private conduct. The Court
will examine all causes in fact of the injury sustained. It will find the state
action to be the proximate cause of the injury if the conduct of the state is
a cause in fact and it appears that the state's action rather than private
conduct is more closely related to the harm-so "closely connected with
the result and of such significance" 102 that the state should, in some
moral sense, be held responsible for the restraint. Otherwise, the Court
will deem the private conduct to be the proximate cause.
2. Application of the Proximate Cause Analysis
The Supreme Court's state action cases generally are consistent with
this analysis. Of course, because the principle suggested ultimately de-
pends upon a subjective, moral judgment, some may disagree that the
decisions can be explained by the asserted principle. The interested
reader is left to determine whether, in all the cases in which the Court
denied state action immunity except one, 103 it can fairly be said that the
private conduct was the proximate cause of the antitrust injury. The
three cases other than Ronwin in which the Court found immunity"°
and the one exception 0" merit brief discussion.
It is important to keep in mind that when the Court has found immu-
99. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 776 & n.2 (1975). The Bar in Gold-
farb was merely an "administrative agency" of the state supreme court. Id.
100. Id. at 791.
101. See 104 S. Ct. at 2006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. W. Prosser & W. Keaton, supra note 73, at 264.
103. Community Comunication Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); California
Retail Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 479 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The one exception
is Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The Boulder and
Lafayette cases, in which municipal conduct was at issue, are discussed infra, throughout.
104. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978); Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
105. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
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nity, it might have done so either because it deemed the conduct of the
state to be the proximate cause or because the private conduct, which
was the proximate cause, was adequately authorized by the state. Thus,
merely because one might conclude that the state was not the proximate
actor in a case in which the Court found immunity does not disprove the
validity of the proximate cause rationale - the Court may have based its
decision on the second prong of the state action doctrine.
In Parker,°6 the state enacted a statute that permitted raisin growers
to petition a state agency for authority to formulate a plan that, in effect,
provided for the restriction of output. 107 The statute authorized the
agency to accept the plan, and thereafter, any violation of the plan was
punishable by civil and criminal sanctions. 108 A raisin grower sued the
individuals administering the statute to enjoin the enforcement of the
program,'0 9 and the Supreme Court held that the defendants were im-
mune from antitrust attack. °
The action of the state in enacting the statute appears to be closely
related to the burden of the restriction imposed upon the plaintiff.
Though the plaintiff presumably would not have been injured had the
raisin growers not submitted the proration plan, the state's action ap-
pears to be more closely related to the plaintiff's injury and could reason-
ably be deemed to have been the proximate cause of it.
In Bates,"'l the Arizona Supreme Court adopted a disciplinary rule,
derived from the American Bar Association Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, that prohibited advertising by attorneys.' 12 The state bar
recommended suspension of the plaintiffs for violating the rule." 3
Although the plaintiffs would not have been harmed had the state bar
not recommended sanctions, and might not have been harmed had the
American Bar Association not restricted advertising in its Code, the
Court held that the defendant state bar was protected by the state action
doctrine. 114
The Court's opinion could be read as an application of the state au-
thorization prong of the state action doctrine, for the Court explicitly
noted the existence of a clearly and affirmatively expressed state policy
and active state supervision.11 5 But the case is consistent with a proxi-
mate cause analysis as well. The plaintiff's injury appears to be more
closely related to the action of the state court in adopting the disciplinary
106. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
107. Id. at 346.
108. Id. at 347.
109. Id. at 344.
110. Id. at 352.
111. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
112. Id. at 355, 360.
113. Id. at 356.
114. Id. at 362-63.
115. The Court commented, "[W]e deem it significant that the state policy is so clearly
and affirmatively expressed and that the State's supervision is so active." Id. at 362.
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rule than to the action of the state bar or national bar association.' 6
In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co.," I7 California enacted
a statute that gave an auto manufacturer's existing franchisee a right to
protest to a state agency the attempted establishment of a new franchise
in the same area."' s If the state agency then found good cause for refus-
ing to allow the new outlet, the new franchise could not be opened. I A
foreclosed auto manufacturer and prospective franchisees sued.'2 ° The
Court held that the scheme was the act of California and therefore im-
mune from antitrust attack.' 2'
Like Bates, this opinion could be read as an application of the state
authorization prong of the doctrine. The Court explicitly noted that the
restraint was the product of a "clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed" state policy'2 2 and "subject to ongoing regulatory supervi-
sion." 123 The decision, however, is also consistent with the proximate
cause rationale. Although it seems clear that the plaintiffs would not
have been injured without actions of existing franchisees and the state
board,124 it appears reasonable to conclude that the state legislature's en-
actment of the statute was the proximate cause of their injuries.
The case that cannot be reconciled easily with the proximate cause
theory is Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.'2" A Louisiana
law permitted distributors and retailers to agree upon resale prices, as
was then permitted'26 by a federal statute, the Miller-Tydings Act.'27 But
the Louisiana law also required retailers who were not parties to the orig-
inal agreement to sell at the price provided by such agreement. 28 That
aspect of the law, in the Court's view, was not sanctioned by the Miller-
Tydings Act. 29 Defendant distributors had attempted to force a non-
116. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (1984). The Court in Ronwin cited
Bates in support of its decision. See ic. Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that Ronwin
was more like Goldfarb than it is like Bates. Id. at 2006-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
majority appears to have the better of the argument. Disciplining the attorney in Bates for
violating the state supreme court's prohibition on advertising is more closely related to
the action of the Arizona court in Ronwin than is paying inflated legal fees because of an
agreement among lawyers not specifically sanctioned by the court.
117. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
118. Id. at 98 n.1.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 104.
121. Id. at 109.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 110.
124. The status of a state agency is discussed infra at notes 164-86 and accompanying
text.
125. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
126. Id. at 386.
127. Miller-Tydings Act, Ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed by the Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §1 (1982))).
128. Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 387.
129. Id. at 389.
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party retailer to adhere to the prices agreed upon with other retailers.' 3
The Court held that the distributors were not protected by the state ac-
tion doctrine, noting that "when a state compels retailers to follow a par-
allel price policy, it demands private conduct which the Sherman Act
forbids."13' But if a distributor forces a retailer to adhere to resale prices
agreed upon with other retailers, surely the proximate cause of the bur-
dened retailer's injury is not the distributor's conduct, but the state's en-
actment of the statute which explicitly provided for that conduct.
In attempting to reconcile Schwegmann with Supreme Court state ac-
tion decisions prior to Ronwin, Professors Areeda and Turner argue that
state action immunity was denied in Schwegmann because the required
state supervision was absent. 132 But this argument conflicts with the
Court's opinion in Ronwin, where the Court stated that the requirements
of clear state policy and active supervision are irrelevant when the opera-
tive, injury-producing conduct is that of the state. 33 The operative con-
duct in Schwegmann was more clearly that of the state than was the
operative conduct in Ronwin.
Professor Robinson has written that "[p]erhaps we should understand
Schwegmann as merely a refusal to extend Parker to general efforts by
state legislatures to create wholesale exemptions from antitrust law, as
distinct from more narrowly targeted efforts to suppress competition in
favor of state regulatory objectives."' 34 He may be right. Schwegmann
might be distinguished from Ronwin on the basis of the scope or magni-
tude of the anticompetitive restraints involved in the two cases. Another
possibility, of course, is that Schwegmann is simply no longer good law.
It is interesting and perhaps telling that neither the Court nor the dissent
in Ronwin cited Schwegmann.
If it is determined that the proximate cause of an anticompetitive re-
straint is the conduct of the state, immunity for all participating public
and private parties should follow ineluctably. The Court in Ronwin is
quite clear about this. The actions of a state "ipsofacto are exempt from
the operation of the antitrust laws."'' 35 Even the dissent in Ronwin re-
marked that when a state itself imposes an anticompetitive restraint, its
action "does not violate the antitrust laws."'
' 36
130. Id. at 385-86.
131. Id. at 389.
132. See 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 213a.
133. 104 S. Ct. 1989, 1996 (1984); see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
134. Robinson, supra note 15, at 133 (footnote omitted).
135. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 1995.
136. Id. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Later the dissent commented: "If respondent
were challenging a restraint of trade imposed by the sovereign itself, this case would be
governed by Parker, which held that the Sherman Act does not apply to the sovereign
acts of States." Id. at 2006 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is clear from the result in Ronwin
that if the state is the proximate actor, the Court will hold both participating private
actors and the state immune. Justice Stevens would hold the state immune, but it is not
certain whether he would also find participating private parties immune. Because he
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B. Private Conduct Authorized by the State
If the proximate cause of the antitrust injury is deemed to be private
conduct, the private actors might still be protected by the second prong
of the state action doctrine, if they can prove that their conduct was suffi-
ciently authorized by the state. The test for the requisite authorization
was stated most succinctly in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 137: "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second,
the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself."' 38
1. Clear State Policy
The Court has put teeth into the requirement of a" 'clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy' to replace competition with reg-
ulation." 139 For instance, if a state supreme court directed a state bar to
oversee the conduct of attorneys and granted the state bar the power to
discipline attorneys acting contrary to the public interest, the mandate
would not be sufficient to allow the bar to enforce a price fixing
scheme."4 The court would have to specify either the prices themselves,
or at least that it intended attorneys to agree upon prices. It must be
apparent that the state had in mind the specific restraint in question.'
The clear state policy requirement makes sense. When private con-
duct restrains competition, there is no reason to immunize that conduct
unless the restraint was intended by the state. As the Ronwin Court ob-
served: "When the activity at issue is not directly that of the legislature
or supreme court, but is carried out by others pursuant to state authori-
zation. . . it becomes important to insure that the anti-competitive con-
found the restraint to be imposed by private parties, the dissent did not have to resolve
that question.
The one possible exception to the principle that an anticompetitive restraint produced
by action of the state does not give rise to antitrust liability for any of the involved parties
was suggested above in the discussion of Schwegmann. Perhaps if the restraint created by
the State is excessively broad, private participants in the scheme will be exposed to anti-
trust liability, though the state may not be.
137. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
138. Id. at 105. The California statute at issue in Midcal required all wine producers,
wholesalers, and rectifiers to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the State and
it required all licensed wholesalers to adhere to the prices set by a single wholesaler
within a trading area. Id. at 99-100. The Court denied state action immunity, holding
that there was a clearly articulated state policy but no active state supervision. Id. at 105.
The Midcal test was cited favorably by the Court in Roniwin, although it was not relevant
to the Court's analysis. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 1995-96 (1984).
139. Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (1984). See generally I P. Areeda & D.
Turner, supra note 33, at 214 (discussion of limits on immunity when there is no au-
thorized state action clearly intended to displace the antitrust laws).
140. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
141. For example, in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40
(1982), discussed infra at notes 194-205 and accompanying text, the Court interpreted the
clear state policy requirement as demanding that the policy reflect that the state "'con-
templated' the specific anticompetitive actions" challenged. Id. at 55.
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duct of the State's representative was contemplated by the State.' 142
Without a clear statement from the state that it intends the private
actors to undertake the challenged conduct, the argument that the re-
straint was contemplated or intended by the state is weak, or at least
weaker than it would be with such a statement. This substantial eviden-
tiary requirement is justified by the significant compromise of federal an-
titrust policy that immunization might cause. For instance, in the above
hypothetical, if the only state directive to the state bar was to oversee the
practice of law in the public interest, the state court may not have consid-
ered the possibility that the bar would fix prices, and if it had, the state
court might have specifically forbidden the conduct. Immunization of
such conduct on the ground that federalism demands some deference to
state policy would be wholly inappropriate.
2. Active State Supervision
The second requirement-that the private conduct be actively super-
vised by the state-is, on balance, unwise, and should be discarded.,43
The requirement might seem to serve a useful purpose: It may be that
the state contemplated a specific anticompetitive restraint but did not, at
the time it authorized the conduct, realize the magnitude of the effect
that the conduct would have. Had it accurately perceived the effect, it
would not have authorized the conduct. Continuing state supervision
will insure that, in such a case, the state will be able to remedy its mis-
take more quickly than it could if it had to rely upon the political process
to acquire the information necessary to prompt corrective action. Fur-
ther, the private actors might exceed the limits of the state mandate.
Such private conduct could and probably would be challenged success-
fully in court. A state actively supervising the private party, however,
might well be able to stop the offending conduct more quickly than could
a court, which could act only after a party had discovered the infraction
and litigated the claim.
It appears that by "active state supervision" the Court means some-
thing akin to traditional public utility regulation."' Professors Areeda
and Turner so understand the requirement, and endorse it, asserting that
immunity is warranted only when a state supplants free market competi-
142. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 1995 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
143. For a general discussion of the state supervision requirement, and a contrary
opinion, see 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 213. For another argument that
the requirement should be abandoned, see Page, supra note 33, at 1125-36.
144. For instance, in Midcal, the Court wrote, "The State neither establishes prices nor
reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair
trade contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in any 'pointed
reexamination' of the program." 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980). This passage fairly de-
scribes many of the functions of utility commissions.
For a description of the authority typically possessed by state regulatory commissions,
see W. Jones, Cases and Materials on Regulated Industries 39-44 (2d ed. 1976); 1 A.
Priest, Principles of Public Utility Regulation 31-33 (1969).
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tion with regulation. 14' There is, however, no reason to assume that fed-
eralism requires deference to a state's decision to restrain competition
only when the state chooses to replace it with regulation. The antitrust
laws embody a federal policy with a single goal: the maximization of
consumer welfare. 14' They seek to achieve that end through the means of
competition. A state may seek to achieve that end through some means
other than competition or regulation. 47 More fundamentally, the state
may choose to sacrifice consumer welfare in pursuit of some other
goal. 1 48 In either case, federalism ought to protect the state's choice.
Federalism focuses upon the identity of the policymaker, not the con-
tent of the policy. The Supreme Court has determined that Congress did
not intend the Sherman Act to displace the policies of states, 4 9 even if
those policies conflict with federal policy or pursue a federal policy goal
in a different way.' The Ronwin Court noted that "[t]he Court did not
suggest in Parker, nor has it suggested since, that a state action is exempt
from antitrust liability only if the sovereign acted wisely .... ., It
should make no difference to the Court whether the state carries out the
policy itself or employs the aid of private parties, as long as it is clear that
the private parties are in fact carrying out the state's policy, and that is
assured by a strict application of the clear articulation requirement.
If state supervision were costless, the benefit of potentially quicker cor-
rection of state misperceptions or private misapplications might justify
imposition of the requirement. But supervision is not costless.' In-
deed, the cost of active state supervision, I believe, far exceeds its poten-
tial benefit. On balance, therefore, the active state supervision
requirement should be abandoned.
3. State Compulsion
In Goldfarb, the Court stated that "[ilt is not enough that . . . an-
145. 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 213a.
146. See infra note 231 and accompanying text.
147. For instance, a state might attempt to force externalities to be internalized,
thereby increasing consumer welfare, by providing a good itself. See infra notes 252-54,
257-58 and accompanying text. Or it might choose to create a private monopoly and
specify the service to be provided, but rely upon judicial remedies for service failures
rather than upon control by a regulatory agency.
148. See infra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
149. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
150. See id.
151. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 1998. The Court also stated that, "where the action com-
plained of ... was that of the State itself, the action is exempt from antitrust liability
regardless of the State's motives in taking the action." Id. at 2001 (emphasis added).
152. A growing body of literature has been devoted to the failure of government regu-
lation and its attendant costs. See e.g., J. Hirshleifer, J. De Haven & J. Milliman, Water
Supply: Economics, Technology, and Policy 74-82 (1960); Easterbrook, supra note 15, at
31; Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Management Sci. 335
(1974); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. Management Sci. 3
(1971); Stigler & Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.
Law & Econ. 1 (1962).
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ticompetitive conduct [by private parties] is 'prompted' by state action;
rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled by direction of the
State acting as a sovereign."'5 3 Ever since, there has been confusion
about whether state compulsion is a third requirement to be satisfied by
private parties claiming state action protection. 54 Ronwin did not end
the controversy. The Court's rationale in that case did not require resolu-
tion of the test for state action immunity of private conduct because the
Court viewed the case as one involving state conduct rather than state-
authorized private conduct. The Court did mention the test without re-
citing the requirement of state compulsion,'55 but the dissenting opinion,
which represents the views of three Justices, repeatedly mentioned the
need for state compulsion. 5 6 The Supreme Court may soon lay the mat-
ter to rest. It has granted certiorari to hear a case in which the Fifth
Circuit held that state compulsion is required when private parties claim
state action immunity.157
Although the issue is not yet settled, a fair reading of the cases indi-
cates that state compulsion is not an independent, necessary condition
for effective authorization of private conduct.'58 This is also the correct
position. Surely a restraint carried out by a private party may be indispu-
tably intended by or within the contemplation of the state without the
state having compelled the private conduct. 59 In Midcal, the Court said
that a private restraint must be consistent with a clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy; it did not explicitly say, and should
not be understood to have said, that the only suitable affirmative expres-
sion of policy is compulsion.' 6°
Although compulsion should not be, and probably is not, a necessary
condition for immunity, at times it should be a sufficient condition. The
state action doctrine should immunize the parties participating in an an-
ticompetitive restraint whenever the restraint is in fact intended or de-
sired by the state. That appears to be the nub of the Parker doctrine,
153. 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
154. For a good summary, see 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 215b
(discussion of possible need of state compulsion for a private party's right to antitrust
immunity); id. at 212.5 (1982 Supp.) ("The role of compulsion in Parker analysis con-
tinues to bedevil both courts and commentators.")
155. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 1995-96.
156. Id. at 2007-09 (Stevens, J., with whom White, J. and Blackmun, J. joined,
dissenting).
157. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 702 F.2d 532
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3508 (1984). The court held that motor carrier
rate bureaus, which agreed upon interstate rates to be proposed to state public service
commissions, were not immunized by the state action doctrine because the conduct was
not compelled by states. Id. at 538.
158. See I P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 215b2.
159. But see United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 702 F.2d 532,
539 (5th Cir. 1983) ("We do not see how a private party can carry out a clearly articu-
lated and affirmatively expressed state policy when it is left to the private party to carry
out that policy or not as he sees fit."), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3508 (1984).
160. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
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When the act of a private party appears to be the cause in fact most
closely related to the restraint, and that act was compelled by the state,
the private party should be immune from antitrust attack, either because
the state act is deemed the proximate cause of the restraint or because the
private act is characterized as the proximate cause but deemed ade-
quately authorized by the state.1 61 If the state compels that private act,
the conclusion seems inescapable that the state intended the restraint
produced by the act. If private conduct other than that compelled by the
state is more closely related to the restraint, the fact that some private
conduct was compelled should not immunize the actor.' 62 Thus, if a state
law compelled attorneys to adhere to the rules promulgated by a local
bar association, and the association adopted a rule requiring adherence to
a schedule of stipulated fees, the members of the association would not be
immune from a price-fixing charge. The private act most closely associ-
ated with the restraint would be the promulgation of the particular rule
(an act not compelled by the state) rather than obedience to it (an act
compelled by the state).
One could argue that the only pertinent requirement is a clear state
policy, and that compulsion by itself is neither sufficient nor necessary,
but is important evidence of the state policy.' 63 This approach is appeal-
ing, in that a clear state policy should be the single necessary condition
for effective state authorization. It is doubtful, however, that any case
would be decided differently under this approach than under the ap-
proach that requires a clear state policy but allows state compulsion to be
a sufficient condition. Disparate results would require the remarkable
case in which a private act that is the cause in fact most closely related to
a restraint was compelled by the state, but in which the state did not
clearly intend the restraint.
161. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
162. Professors Areeda and Turner argue that Schwegmann forecloses the possibility
that compulsion can be a sufficient condition for immunity because that case held that a
state command to its citizens ordering them to disobey the Sherman Act does not immu-
nize the private actors. 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at r 215bl. But Schweg-
mann, if it is still good law at all, can better be understood as holding that state action
will not immunize those adhering to a clear state policy to displace the antitrust laws on a
wholesale basis. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Thus, compulsion can be
viewed as a sufficient condition for immunity, except perhaps when it applies to a broad
and ill-defined range of activities.
Professors Areeda and Turner also argue that compulsion by a foreign government
might excuse conduct that would otherwise violate the antitrust law, because it would be
unreasonable to subject innocent private parties to inconsistent sovereign directions. 1 P.
Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 215bl. They argue that justification does not
apply to conduct compelled by state governments, however, because, under the Constitu-
tion, state laws conflicting with federal statutes are invalid. This might be persuasive if
federal law always preempted inconsistent state law. However, because "federal law may
expressly or. . . impliedly give way to state law," id., they admit, as they must, that
federal law does not always prevail. It seems just as unfair to force innocent private par-
ties to predict when a court will hold that federal law impliedly gives way to state law as
it is to force them to choose between the inconsistent directives of national sovereigns.




The discussion thus far has assumed a model in which there are three
relevant entities: the state, meaning either the legislature, the supreme
court acting in a legislative capacity, or perhaps the governor;' 64 private
parties who interact with the state to produce a restraint; and, the victim.
To understand some cases, however, a fourth player has to be added-a
legitimate state agency. By "legitimate", I mean an agency composed of
individuals who are not directly economically interested in the subject of
their regulation. The need for this qualification can be seen by compar-
ing Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.'65 with Goldfarb.166
In Cantor the investor-owned electric utility had a policy of giving its
customers light bulbs for no additional charge. 67 The policy was insti-
tuted prior to the creation of the Michigan Public Service Commis-
sion, 168 and was duly embodied in a tariff filed with the Commission after
that agency came into existence.' 69 By not rejecting the filed tariff, the
Commission implicitly approved it.'7 ° Once a tariff is approved by the
Commission, state law requires that the utility adhere to it.' 71 The tariff
can be changed only with the approval of the Commission. The idea of
the free light bulb program clearly originated with the utility, not the
Commission, as it was in place before the state began regulating electric
utilities. The only evidence that the Commission endorsed the program
was its tacit approval of the original and subsequent pertinent tariffs and
the negative implication arising from the fact that the Commission ap-
proved the utility's request to abandon the program with respect to com-
mercial customers. 72
In a welter of opinions, 73 a majority of the Court held that Detroit
Edison was not protected from antitrust attack by the state action doc-
trine." 4 Though the free light bulb policy was a "blend of private and
public decisionmaking,"' 175 the Court viewed the operative decision (the
164. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
165. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
166. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
167. 428 U.S. at 582.




171. Id. at 582-83.
172. See id. at 583.
173. Four separate opinions were filed. Four Justices took the position that the Parker
doctrine protected only state officials, and was therefore inapplicable to Detroit Edison
Co. Id. at 585-92. The Chief Justice rejected that reasoning but concurred in the judg-
ment. Id. at 603-04 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also concurred in the
judgment, but on the ground that state-sanctioned private anticompetitive activity is sim-
ply to be judged under the rule of reason, and that the challenged activity failed that test.
Id. at 610-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Three Justices joined in a dissenting opinion.
Id. at 614 (Stewart, J., with whom Powell, J. and Rehnquist, J. joined, dissenting).
174. Id. at 598.
175. Id. at 592.
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proximate cause, if you will) to be the act of the utility. 76 Under the
model in which there are only three relevant actors, immunity would
require at least a policy, consistent with the private conduct, clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed by the state legislature, the supreme
court, or perhaps the governor. Yet the Court implied that had the light
bulb policy been the decision of the Public Service Commission, Edison
would have been protected: "Respondent could not maintain the lamp-
exchange program without the approval of the Commission, and now
may not abandon it without such approval. Nevertheless, there can be
no doubt that the option to have, or not to have, such a program is pri-
marily respondent's, not the Commission's.",,77
One might conclude, then, that we should simply redefine the state
entity to encompass not only the legislature, supreme court, and perhaps
governor, but all state agencies as well.' 78 Thus, the private party would
be immune when it acts pursuant to a policy clearly articulated by a state
agency. In Goldfarb, however, the attorney fee schedule policy was
clearly articulated by the state bar, which was a state agency by law.179
That was not enough for immunity.
Cantor should be distinguished from Goldfarb on the basis of the char-
acter of the agencies involved. In Cantor, the agency was an independent
regulatory commission. It was composed of regulators, financially disin-
terested in the utilities under their authority, 8 ° who the Court could as-
sume would act in the public interest. Goldfarb involved a different kind
of agency. The governing body of the state bar was composed of lawyers
who themselves were subject to their own regulation. It was like the
guilds about which Justice Stevens cautioned in his Ronwin dissent:
Guilds were mechanisms for private tradesmen to protect not only the
public but their own economic interests as well.' 8 ' The Court is not will-
ing to assume that an agency economically interested in the subject of its
regulation is acting solely in the public interest, as it assumes in the case
of a disinterested agency, and rightly so. For the sake of convenience,
and strictly for purposes of state action immunity, the disinterested
176. Id. at 594.
177. Id. (emphasis added). In a part of the opinion representing only a plurality of the
Court, Justice Stevens wrote, "Neither the Michigan Legislature, nor the Commission,
has ever made any specific investigation of the desirability of a lamp-exchange program
or of its possible effect on competition in the light-bulb market." Id. at 584 (emphasis
added).
178. That, of course, is not how the Court defined "state" in Ronwin. See supra note
62 and accompanying text.
179. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 789-90; see also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 409 (1978) (restating the issue in Goldfarb). In an opinion
representing the views of four justices, Justice Brennan wrote: "Plainly petitioners are in
error in arguing that Parker held that all governmental entities, whether state agencies or
subdivisions of a State, are, simply by reason of their status as such, exempt from the
antitrust laws." City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408.
180. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 460.1 (West 1967).
181. See Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 2003.04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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agency will be labeled "legitimate" and the interested agency
"illegitimate."
An illegitimate agency, in this state action model, stands in the posi-
tion of private parties participating in an anticompetitive restraint. If its
actions or the actions of private parties directed by it are the proximate
cause of antitrust injury, the agency will be immune under the state ac-
tion doctrine only if the actions are consistent with a policy clearly and
affirmatively expressed by the state legislature, the supreme court, or per-
haps the governor.
But what is the status of the legitimate agency in the state action
model? It is not that of a private party, and obviously it is not that of the
victim. Yet the Court in Ronwin did not include "agency" in its defini-
tion of the state. ' 82 In effect, however, the legitimate agency stands in the
position of the state, as long as it has general authority from the state
legislative entity to act in the relevant area. In Cantor, the Michigan
Legislature vested the Public Service Commission with "complete power
and jurisdiction to regulate all public utilities in the state."18 3 It con-
ferred "express power on the Commission 'to regulate all rates, fares,
fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of service, and all other matters
pertaining to the formation, operation, or direction of such public utili-
ties.' ""4 This grant of authority would certainly seem a sufficient man-
date from the state such that if the light bulb program had been the
clearly and affirmatively expressed policy of the Commission, the utility
would have been protected under the state action doctrine even though
the program was not the clearly expressed policy of the legislature.' 85 Of
course, if a legitimate agency can immunize private conduct deemed the
proximate cause of a restraint, a fortiori the agency itself, as well as any
associated private parties, will be immunized if the agency's act, taken
within the scope of delegated authority, is deemed the proximate cause of
the restraint. 1
86
182. See id. at 1995.
183. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 584 (1976) (quoting Mich Comp.
Laws Ann. § 460.6 (West 1970)).
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. Of course, private conduct consistent with a clear policy expressed by the legisla-
ture will be protected even if there is no similar policy expressed by the agency.
Further, it could be argued that private conduct consistent with a legitimate agency's
directive which is beyond the scope of the agency's delegated authority, as well as the
agency's conduct itself, should be protected from antitrust attack. The claim would be
that any victims of such conduct should challenge the actions under state administrative
law, not the antitrust laws. Exposing the transgression to antitrust liability, however, is
consistent with the Court's general reluctance to confer antitrust immunity, and it proba-
bly would do some good without doing any real harm.
186. The character of the agency is also relevant to the active state supervision require-
ment. Active supervision by an illegitimate agency would not satisfy the requirement,




A brief recapitulation is useful at this point. If a plaintiff brings an
antitrust suit against a state itself, he will lose. If he sues a private party
(including an illegitimate state agency) that claims state action immu-
nity, the defense may succeed in one of two ways. First, the court may
find that the proximate cause of the restraint was conduct of the state
itself and dismiss the suit. Second, the court may find that the proximate
cause of the restraint was the defendant's conduct, but that it was suffi-
ciently authorized by the state to immunize the private actor.
Adequate authorization requires a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy and active state supervision. It does not require
state compulsion of the challenged conduct, although if the state did
compel the private conduct deemed the proximate cause of the restraint,
that action will satisfy the clear state policy requirement. The "state," for
purposes of this doctrine, includes the legislature, the state's highest
court acting in a legislative capacity, perhaps the governor, and legiti-
mate state agencies, as long as these agencies are acting within the scope
of their delegated power. It does not include illegitimate agencies, which
stand in the same position as private parties.
II. CURRENT APPLICATION OF STATE ACTION TO MUNICIPALITIES
In the model developed above, municipalities- governmental subdivi-
sions of states-might be treated in one of three ways: as states, so that
they are ipso facto immune from the antitrust laws; as legitimate state
agencies, so that they are immune as long as their acts that proximately
cause antitrust injury are within the scope of their delegated power; or, as
private parties, so that they are immune only if their acts that proxi-
mately cause antitrust injury are taken pursuant to a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy and are actively supervised by the
state. The Supreme Court has held that municipalities do not fall into
either of the first two categories; they will be treated either like private
parties or in yet a fourth way.
A. Existing Precedent
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,' 87 the first munici-
pal antitrust immunity case, a plurality of the Court held that municipal-
ities do not stand in the position of states for purposes of state action
immunity simply by virtue of their status as municipalities.'88 In that
case, an investor-owned electric utility filed a counterclaim to the munici-
palities' antitrust complaint alleging that the municipalities had violated
the antitrust laws by engaging in various acts designed to injure the util-
ity as a competitor in the provision of electric service in the area within
187. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
188. Id. at 411.
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and surrounding the cities' boundaries. 189 Four Justices rejected the mu-
nicipalities' claim that their "status as such automatically affords [them]
the 'state action' exemption."' 90 The Chief Justice, however, reasoned
that a municipality is not protected from the antitrust laws when it acts
in a proprietary capacity, but, apparently, is protected when it acts in a
governmental capacity. 191 Four dissenting Justices would have held that
because municipalities are governmental bodies, they are immune,' 92 at
least when they are not acting in concert with private parties. 93
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,194 the Court
held that cities do not occupy the position of legitimate state agencies.95
The Constitution of Colorado established Boulder as a "home rule" mu-
nicipality, granting the people of the city "the full right of self-govern-
ment in both local and municipal matters."' 96 The city had granted the
plaintiff cable television company a nonexclusive, revocable permit to
provide service in the city. 197 The company exercised the permit only in a
limited area of the city for fourteen years. 198 When technology improved,
however, it informed the City Council that it intended to expand service
into new areas of the city.1 99 But the city council, having been ap-
proached by a second cable company interested in providing competing
cable service throughout the city, enacted an emergency moratorium or-
dinance that prohibited the incumbent from expanding into new areas for
three months, while the city formulated a new cable policy that took
account of the advanced technology and potential competition. 2° The
incumbent sued the city, claiming that the ordinance violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act.2° '
The city council's action was sufficiently within the scope of authority
granted by the home rule provision of the state constitution such that,
had the delegation been made to a legitimate state agency, the agency
would have been protected from antitrust challenge for promulgating a
moratorium rule.202 The Court, however, said that a municipality will be
protected only if its actions were undertaken "pursuant to a clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. ' 20 3 The Court went on
to emphasize this point, noting that a state policy, to be sufficient to im-
189. Id. at 391-92, 403-05.
190. Id. at 411.
191. See id. at 418, 422, 425 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
192. See id. at 426-29.
193. See id. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
195. See id. at 53, 55.
196. Id. at 43.
197. Id. at 44.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 44-45.
200. Id. at 45-46.
201. Id. at 46-47.
202. See supra notes 177, 183-86 and accompanying text.
203. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54.
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part immunity, would have to demonstrate that the state contemplated
the specific anticompetitive actions challenged:
[P]lainly the requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expres-
sion" is not satisfied when the State's position is one of mere neutrality
respecting the municipal actions challenged as anticompetitive. A
State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be
said to have "contemplated" the specific anticompetitive actions for
which municipal liability is sought. Nor can those actions be truly
described as "comprehended within the powers granted," since the
term, "granted," necessarily implies an affirmative addressing of the
subject by the State. 2 4
At least to the extent that municipal immunity requires a clear state
policy, the Court held that municipalities will be treated like private par-
ties. The Court, however, did not determine whether municipalities
would be subject to the second requirement of state action immunity for
private parties: active state supervision. It noted that "[b]ecause we con-
clude in the present case that Boulder's moratorium ordinance does not
satisfy the 'clear articulation and affirmative expression' criterion, we do
not reach the question of whether that ordinance must or could satisfy
the 'active state supervision' test focused upon in Mdcal. '211 Thus, mu-
nicipalities may be subject to only one part of the two-part state action
test applicable to private parties.
B. Town of Hallie and the Active State Supervision Requirement
In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,2°6 the Seventh Circuit held
that when the challenged activity pertains to a traditional municipal
function, municipalities are not required to satisfy the active state super-
vision condition for state action immunity.2 "7 The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari.208 The defendant city, operating within its borders the
only sewage treatment facility in the region, refused to supply sewage
treatment to the plaintiffs, four adjacent townships .2' The city provided
sewage treatment facilities to individuals located in the townships only if
they agreed to be annexed by the city and thereby obtain sewage collec-
tion and transportation services from the city.2" The court held that the
204. Id. at 55 (emphasis in original).
205. Id. at 51-52 n.14.
206. 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), cert granted, 104 S. Ct. 3508 (1984).
207. Id. at 384; accord, Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 726 F.2d
1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer & Standby Serv., Inc. v.
Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005, 1014 (8th Cir. 1983), petition for cerL filed, 52 U.S.L.W.
3039 (U.S. July 25, 1983) (No. 83-138). But see Mason City Center Assocs. v. Mason
City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 742 (N.D. Iowa 1979) (A consideration of "special significance"
in determining municipal immunity is whether "the state policy requiring the anticompe-
titive restraint is ... actively supervised by the state as the policymaker.") (emphasis in
original).
208. See 104 S. Ct. 3508 (1984).




city was protected under the Parker doctrine.21' It found that the city's
actions were undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed state policy, basing its decision on three facts. First, a
state statute provided that a city may delineate the unincorporated area
within which it will provide service and has no obligation to serve beyond
that area.z1 2 Second, another statute provided that the state department
of natural resources may order a city to provide sewage service to an
unincorporated area, but that the order, which would not take effect for
thirty days, would become void if the electors in the area refused to be
annexed to the city.213 Third, the Wisconsin Supreme Court construed
these and other statutes to evince an intent on the part of the state legisla-
ture to permit a city to require annexation as a reasonable quid pro quo
for supplying sewer services to an unincorporated area.21 4
Although some of the court's language on the specificity of the state
authorization necessary to satisfy the clear articulation and affirmative
expression standard appears to go too far, the court's holding was cor-
rect. 21 5 The state legislature apparently "'contemplated' the specific an-
ticompetitive actions for which municipal liability" 216 was sought, and
more importantly, the state supreme court so found.21 7
The court further held that the active supervision requirement does
not apply to municipalities performing traditional municipal func-
tions.21 8 Though I believe that the requirement should be abandoned al-
together, it is not clear why the requirement should be applied to private
parties but not municipalities. The court stated that "[s]upervision [of
municipalities] is unnecessary because local governments operate pursu-
211. Id.
212. Id. at 382.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 383.
215. The court cited the fairly liberal language of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), instead of the relatively strict statement of the require-
ment in the more recent Boulder opinion. 700 F.2d at 381. The court then said, "[I]f we
can determine that the state gave the City authority to operate in the area of sewage
services and to refuse to provide treatment services, then we can assume that the State
contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result from conduct pursuant to that au-
thorization." Id. (footnote omitted). The first part of this statement is incorrect but the
second is correct. It plainly is not enough that a state authorizes a city to provide or not
to provide a type of service. It is true, however, that a court may assume that a legisla-
ture is cognizant of the anticompetitive effects of the conduct it authorizes. Here, the
specific conduct authorized is withholding sewage service unless the requesting custom-
ers accept annexation. This is far more than simply allowing cities to provide or refuse to
provide service. But it can be assumed that the legislature was aware of the effects that
this conduct might have on customers and affected townships. The authorization, there-
fore, satisfies the clear state policy standard.
216. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982).
217. See Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d 533, 314 N.W.2d 321
(1982).
218. 700 F.2d at 384. The court also held that state compulsion is not a necessary
condition for municipal immunity. Id. at 381. On this point, the court is correct. See
supra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
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ant to clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed restraints imposed
by the state in its policies and delegation of authority."2t 9 This statement,
however, confuses the purpose of the clear state policy requirement with
that of the active supervision requirement. Certainly it is important that
the state delineate what subordinate actors may or may not do; other-
wise, anticompetitive conduct may be allowed out of deference to a state
that would have prohibited the activity had it contemplated the con-
duct.22° That is the reason for the clear state policy requirement, which,
according to the Supreme Court, applies to both municipalities and pri-
vate parties.22' Likewise, the Seventh Circuit's observation applies to pri-
vate parties as well as municipalities, and cannot be used to distinguish
between the two for purposes of the active supervision requirement.
The supervision requirement does, however, have an independent pur-
pose: to hasten corrective action when a state has misperceived the conse-
quences of conduct it authorized or when a party exceeds the limits of its
authorization.222 Perhaps a municipality, because of its public character,
is somehow inherently less likely than a private party to transgress the
bounds of its authorization, making this aspect of the requirement's pur-
pose less relevant. But there is no reason to believe that a state is any
more likely to miscalculate the effects of specifically authorized private
conduct than the consequences of specifically authorized municipal activ-
ities. If any distinction can be drawn between the two types of actors, it
probably has more to do with the relative costs of imposing the require-
ment in the two contexts than with the benefits.
The Seventh Circuit identified one cost that imposition of the require-
ment would force municipalities but not private parties to bear. The re-
quirement "would erode the concept of local autonomy and home rule
authority which is expressed in the statutes and constitution of Wiscon-
sin. "223 Of course, imposition of the clear state policy requirement on
cities also "erodes the concept of local autonomy," but that did not stop
the Supreme Court from applying this requirement to municipalities.2 4
The marginal erosion produced by applying the supervision requirement
in addition to the clear state policy requirement may be small. In any
event, the amount of erosion will be affected by the type and degree of
219. Id. at 384.
220. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
221. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 48-57
(1982).
222. See supra note 143.
223. 700 F.2d at 384. The Seventh Circuit specified two other reasons for its decision,
neither of which is persuasive. It said that "courts would have to make the difficult
determination of what 'active' supervision is in terms of frequency and effectiveness." Id.
(footnote omitted). Courts often have to make difficult determinations, including deciding
when a state policy is sufficiently clear. They must also judge the adequacy of supervision
in the context of private parties. The court also said that states would have to "spend
their limited resources actively supervising" municipalities. Id. That supervision is ex-
pensive has not deterred the Court from requiring that states supervise private parties.
224. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982).
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
supervision required. Depending upon those factors, the marginal ero-
sion of autonomy may be insignificant.
One could argue that supervision of municipalities would impose a
greater cost on the state than would supervision of private actors. States
are experienced in actively supervising private parties; they have been
regulating utilities for over a century. 225 But they are not so experienced
in supervising municipalities, and developing the necessary expertise and
methods of supervision would be expensive. This argument, however, is
highly speculative. Further, it ignores the fact that the kind of supervi-
sion that would be adequate and appropriate for municipalities might be
significantly less expensive than that required for private parties.
In sum, it appears that the costs of active supervision exceed the bene-
fits in all contexts and, thus, the requirement should be abandoned. But if
the Court continues to impose the requirement upon private parties and
continues to treat municipalities differently from states, not to impose the
supervision requirement upon municipalities would be arbitrary.
III. PROPOSED APPROACH TO MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST EXPOSURE
Municipalities should be treated exactly like states for purposes of im-
munity from the antitrust laws. Thus, a municipality should be immune
from antitrust liability for acts that proximately cause antitrust injury.
Private parties shbuld also be immune from liability for their acts that
proximately cause antitrust injury if those acts are undertaken pursuant
to a policy clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed by the munici-
pality. The Supreme Court has reached a different result because it has
not been able to infer an intent on the part of the Congress that enacted
the antitrust laws to withold application to municipalities, although it
has inferred such an intent with regard to the states. The Supreme Court,
I believe, has misconstrued the legislative intent. Assuming, however,
that the Court is correct, Congress ought to adopt legislation that would
accomplish the suggested result, and leave no room for doubt about its
intent. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,226 which shields
municipalities from antitrust damages, is neither adequate nor theoreti-
cally sound.
Nowhere in the Sherman Act does Congress explicitly withold applica-
tion to the states. In Parker, the Court admitted that "[t]he Sherman Act
makes no mention of the state as such. ' ' 227 Nor does the Sherman Act
expressly refer to municipalities. Therefore, any difference in application
of the law to states and municipalities cannot be attributed to an explicit
225. The modem regulatory movement is traced to the formation of the Massachusetts
Board of Railroad Commissioners in 1869. W. Jones, supra note 144, at 3 1. More pow-
erful regulatory commissions emerged during the next ten years, as a product of the
Granger movement. Id. at 39-41.
226. 47 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 753 (Oct. 25, 1984); see id. at 716-18, 737
(Oct. 18, 1984).
227. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
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statutory distinction. Rather, the Court inferred an exemption for state
conduct:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of
government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their author-
ity, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers
and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.228
The Parker Court's reasoning was negative and depended upon general
principles of federalism: As neither the language nor history of the stat-
ute demonstrates an intent that it be applied to states, and because appli-
cation would conflict with a generalized interest in state sovereignty,
Congress will be presumed not to have intended application to the states.
Since Parker, however, the Court has seemed consistently reluctant to
find implied immunity for state actions, appearing to concede immunity
only grudgingly.229 That history is understandable, given the character of
the reasoning originally used to find immunity.
However true it is that one should not lightly imply exemptions from
federal statutes, and particularly from "the Magna Carta of free enter-
prise," 30 affirmative and specific reasons support the position that the
antitrust laws should not be applied to democratic governmental bodies.
Some of these reasons apply with even greater force in the context of
municipal governments than in that of state governments. The very pur-
pose of the Sherman Act, as well as the important but general interests of
federalism, may be disserved by application of the statute to these enti-
ties. Though the Congress that passed the Sherman Act almost certainly
never considered the issue of application to governmental bodies, the
proper inference from the purpose of the Act is that Congress would
have explicitly exempted them had it fully understood the implications of
exposing municipalities to antitrust liability.
What follows, then, is an argument that municipalities should be im-
mune from the antitrust laws. Most of this discussion applies to state
immunity as well. Because the Supreme Court has denied municipal im-
munity only because it could not infer the necessary legislative intent,
this analysis constitutes an argument for a different inference, and, conse-
quently, a different conclusion. To the extent that the Court remains
unconvinced of the argument for finding a different legislative intent, the
analysis constitutes an argument for a new statement of congressional
policy. Protecting municipalities from damage liability was a step in the
228. Id. at 350-51.
229. Of the cases mentioned in notes 37-38, supra, only in New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978), was immunity found.
230. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); see also City of Lafay-
ette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398-400 (1978) (exclusions from the
antitrust laws will not be implied lightly).
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right direction, but Congress should go further and immunize municipal-
ites altogether.
A. Efficiency as the Goal of the Antitrust Laws
The antitrust laws should be construed to serve a single purpose-the
maximization of consumer welfare.231 I do not intend here to join the
debate that has raged among scholars for years as to whether the anti-
trust laws should be interpreted to serve additional goals.232 Suffice it to
say that I think the "Chicago-School" theorists233 have the better of the
argument. Even the Supreme Court might be moving in their direction,
having recently observed that the Sherman Act "was especially intended
to serve" the interests of the consumer.234
Consumer welfare is synonymous with allocative efficiency. 235 The
consumer welfare model has at its root the idea that when goods and
services are provided under conditions of pure competition, resources
will move to their highest valued uses.236 Competition forces price down
to marginal cost, so that no consumer who values the good more than the
cost of supplying it is denied the good. Thus, resources are allocated in
the most efficient manner.237 The principle implicit in the antitrust laws
is that a competitive market economy will maximize efficiency or, stated
otherwise, maximize the welfare of consumers.238 If any supplier (or
group of suppliers) manages to suppress competition, it will have an in-
centive to reduce output, raise price above marginal cost, and thereby
maximize its own profit.239 Thus, some consumers-those at the mar-
231. See 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 11 103-05; R. Bork, supra note 1,
at 81; R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 8, 18-20 (1976).
Although I believe that consumer welfare should be the only objective in construing
the antitrust laws, it is not clear that a contrary assumption would dictate any different
result on the issue of municipal immunity. Certainly some political goals that might be
attributed to the antitrust laws are more severely impaired by municipal liability than is
the goal of consumer welfare. For expositional simplicity, however, I adhere to the posi-
tion that the only goal is efficiency.
232. See 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 109-09b; Blake & Jones, To-
ward A Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 422 (1965).
233. Two of the most prominent are Richard A. Posner and Frank H. Easterbrook.
234. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1559-60 (1984).
235. There are many expositions of the economics of antitrust, from the simple to the
sophisticated. Among the more lucid explanations are the following: R. Bork, supra note
1, at 107-15; R. Posner, supra note 231, at 237-55; R. Posner & F. Easterbrook, Antitrust:
Cases, Economic Notes, and Other Materials 1055-69 (2d ed. 1981) (section written by
W. Landes). For a more detailed discussion, the reader might consult a good
microeconomics text, such as: D. Dewey, Microeconomics: The Analysis of Prices and
Markets (1975); C. Ferguson & J. Gould, Microeconomic Theory (5th ed. 1980); J.
Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications (2d ed. 1980); H. Kohler, Intermediate
Microeconomics: Theory and Applications (1982).
236. See R. Bork, supra note 1, 107-08, 111.
237. See id. at 107-08, 111.
238. See id. at 50-51, 81; C. Ferguson and J. Gould, supra note 235, at 220-21.




gin-will be denied the good even though they value it more than the
cost of supplying it to them. Of course, all other consumers-infra-mar-
ginal consumers-will have to pay more than the cost of the goods, but
they will acquire the goods. The inflated price produces an economic
profit that represents merely a transfer of wealth from these consumers to
the supplier. The effect on them does not reduce efficiency. Efficiency is
reduced, however, by the effect on marginal consumers. The amount of
the reduction, called the deadweight welfare loss, equals the amount by
which the value to consumers of goods not supplied exceeds the cost that
would have been incurred in supplying those goods. 2
°
A municipality can injure consumer welfare in two ways: It can act in
such a way that the price of some good or service exceeds the cost,
thereby enabling a monopoly profit to be earned, or it can act in such a
way that a good is supplied by an inefficient supplier. In the latter case
the good is supplied at economic cost, so that no monopoly profit is
earned, but the cost is higher than that at which the good could be pro-
vided by a more efficient supplier. Both of these actions require some
interference with a competitive market. Before examining more closely
these ways in which a municipality might injure consumer welfare by
restraining competition, it is important to outline all the ways in which a
municipality might act to affect competition.
B. Objectives a City Might Pursue that Affect Competition
A city may act in one of four ways that affect competition: to promote
competition; to correct market defects; to promote some value other than
efficiency; or to generate a monopoly profit.
1. Municipal Action to Promote Competition
First, a city may act to facilitate competition. This objective is com-
monly associated with the federal government, as evidenced, for exam-
ple, by the securities laws,24" ' but it can motivate municipal governments
as well.
Suppose a city constructs a facility for both the wholesale and the dis-
tribution of food. It designates areas within this center for transactions
in different food types and confines merchants to their designated areas.
These restrictions facilitate the functioning of the market by reducing
information costs: A banana customer need only explore a limited area to
canvass the prices of all fruit sellers, rather than having to roam the ex-
panses of the entire facility. Yet a fresh fruit wholesaler claims that the
city has violated the antitrust laws by conspiring with other fruit whole-
240. R Bork, supra note 1, at 107-15.
241. For a general overview of securities laws and government objectives, see R. Jen-
nings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 1-13 (5th ed. 1982).
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salers to prevent him from setting up shop in the grocery department. 24 2
The facts of Boulder illustrate another municipal attempt to facilitate
competition.24 3 Competition in the real world has a temporal element. It
takes time for competitors to acquire information on which to base their
offerings and for consumers to evaluate the products and services offered.
The city attempted to buy time for the competitive process to work by
preventing one cable television company from acting prematurely. After
the necessary information was acquired by all firms and embodied in
competing proposals, the city could reap the fruits of competition, but
not before.
To be sure, this type of municipal action is designed to and does affect
competition. But it promotes competition and increases consumer wel-
fare. In other words, it serves the specific purpose of the antitrust laws.
Whenever a city intentionally acts to promote competition, it should not
be exposed to antitrust liability. Of course, the city may be wrong. Con-
duct designed to enhance competition may, in reality, have the opposite
effect. Penalizing the city under the antitrust laws for that kind of error
in judgment, however, seems excessive, unnecessary and inappropriate.
Simply bringing the error to the attention of the city through political or
governmental processes should suffice.
2. Municipal Action to Correct Market Defects
Second, the municipality might act to correct market defects. The
purpose of the antitrust laws is to increase allocative efficiency. The as-
sumption implicit in the laws is that competition-or a market mecha-
nism-will achieve that end. The assumption is generally true, but there
are several situations in which the market is known to fail, in which com-
petition will not maximize consumer welfare. 2" The major instances of
these are public goods, natural monopoly and externalities.245
242. See Jetro Cash & Carry Enters., Inc. v. Food Distribution Center, 569 F. Supp.
1404 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
243. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982),
discussed supra at notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
244. The concept of "market failure" is discussed in all microeconomics texts. The
clearest, most succinct and most entertaining discussion, however, is contained in G.
Stigler, The Economists' Traditional Theory of the Economic Functions of the State, in
The Citizen and the State 104-13 (1975). For other discussions, see the materials cited
supra at note 235, and the following: J. Due & A. Friedlaender, Government Finance:
Economics of the Public Sector 9-107 (7th ed. 1981); R. Haveman, The Economics of the
Public Sector 17-46 (1970); W. Hirsch, The Economics of State and Local Government
11-48 (1970); N. Singer, Public Microeconomics 69-115 (2d ed. 1976).
245. See the sources as cited in note 244, supra. Professor Stigler treats natural monop-
oly as a sub-category of externalities. G. Stigler, supra note 244, at 105-06. For purposes
of expositional clarity, it is here treated as an independent category of market failure.
Further, he adds a category labelled "erroneous decisions." Id. at 104, 108-10. Again,
purely for purposes of clarity, "erroneous decisions" will be analyzed under the topic of





A public good has two properties: It can be consumed simultaneously
by more than one individual, and the cost of excluding any one individ-
ual from consuming it, without excluding all other individuals, is infi-
nite.246 Police protection is an example of a public good routinely
provided by municipalities. A Fourth of July fireworks display is an-
other. Because many people can enjoy the public good if it is supplied to
one, every person has an incentive to understate the value of the good to
him.247 If I know that I will enjoy the benefit of the fireworks exhibition
if you pay for it, I will have an incentive to represent that it is worth less
to me than it really is. A market will therefore produce less than the
optimum amount of the good. In such a case, a city might produce the
good itself or contract with a private seller to do so. 248 In either case, the
objective will be to increase efficiency by supplying more of the good than
would be supplied by a competitive market.
b. Natural Monopoly
A natural monopoly refers to a situation in which a good can be sup-
plied at a constantly decreasing average unit cost throughout the range of
relevant outputs.249 Local distribution of electricity is considered a natu-
ral monopoly.25 ° An implication of this condition of increasing returns to
scale is that a single producer can supply the entire amount demanded at
a lower total cost than can multiple producers. Competition, therefore,
cannot be expected to result in a stable supply of the optimum amount of
output. A single supplier of a natural monopoly good, however, has the
incentive of any monopolist: to reduce output, raise prices and maximize
profit. Thus, a city might undertake production itself, contract with a
private firm for the optimum amount of supply, or in this case, regulate a
private provider.2 5 ' The city would interfere with the market, but with
the objective and potential effect of increasing efficiency.
c. Externalities
An externality is an effect of an economic decision, whether beneficial
or harmful, upon a party who was not a party to the decision. 52 If pro-
duction of a good results in beneficial, or positive, externalities, the mar-
ket will produce less than the optimum amount of the good; if
246. See W. Hirsch, supra note 244, at 1; G. Stigler, supra note 244, at 107.
247. See R. Haveman, supra note 244, at 42-43; G. Stigler, supra note 244, at 108.
248. See W. Neenan, Urban Public Economics 171, 174-75 (1981).
249. See R. Haveman, supra note 244, at 32; N. Singer, supra note 244, at 86-91.
250. See W. Jones, supra note 144, at 6, 11-14. For an analysis of how maximum effi-
ciency may result in natural monopoly, see N. Singer, supra note 244, at 81-87.
251. See generally W. Neenan, supra note 248, at 170-75 (discussion of options avail-
able to a municipality); N. Singer, supra note 244, at 91-93 (government encouraging
private entry into the market).
252. See R. Haveman, supra note 244, at 33-35; N. Singer, supra note 244, at 107; G.
Stigler, supra note 244, at 104.
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production results in harmful, or negative, externalities, the market will
produce more than the optimum amount of the good.253 For instance, it
might be worth $5 to me to have garbage removed from my premises.
The odor and unsightliness of the refuse might impose an additional cost
of $10 on my neighbors. If removal of the trash costs $10 and entails a
simple market transaction between me and the garbage collector, the
trash will stay, since I am unwilling to pay more than $5 and the collec-
tor is unwilling to accept less than $10. Removal, however, would in-
crease efficiency. The presence of the garbage imposes a total cost of $15
on all those affected, but it could be removed at a cost of only $10. Ex-
ternalities exist because transactions are not costless.254 If my neighbors
could, without cost, pony up the $10 benefit they would receive from the
disposal of the trash, the trash would be removed. But even this relatively
simple transaction is costly; more complicated transactions can be al-
most incomprehensibly expensive. A city may act to force economic de-
cisions to take account of externalities. Thus, the city might collect the
trash itself or pay a private collector to provide the service, in either case
drawing $10 from tax revenues.
d. Implications of Correcting Market Defects
Any of these municipal interferences with competition might increase
consumer welfare. Private firms might also act to eliminate or exclude
competition, but that private interference is not likely to increase con-
sumer welfare. As rational profit maximizers, private firms are interested
in their own welfare. An increase in their welfare would be likely to re-
duce efficiency, but even if it increased consumer welfare, that effect
would be purely fortuitous. 25 5 For purposes of antitrust liability, then,
one distinction between private and municipal conduct is that municipal
conduct may be intended to and in fact may accomplish an increase in
consumer welfare, which is the goal of the antitrust laws, whereas private
conduct will not be intended to increase consumer welfare and rarely will
have that effect.
It would be singularly perverse to impose antitrust liability upon a city
for interfering with competition in a way by which efficiency is enhanced.
Determining the optimum amount of a public good or the magnitude of
externalities, for instance, is not an easy task. The market, the usual
mechanism for measuring consumer preferences, is, by definition, flawed.
253. See R. Haveman, supra note 244, at 35-39; N. Singer, supra note 244, at 107-15.
254. See G. Stigler, supra note 244, at 106-07; Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.
L. & Econ. 1, 1-44 (1960).
255. For example, the competitive market may fail when negative externalities exist.
Allocative efficiency would require that output be reduced, but a monopolist, attempting
solely to maximize his profit, would also reduce output to the point at which marginal
revenue equaled his marginal, private cost. The reduced output produced by the monop-
olist may, by chance, equal the efficient output, and therefore, his action would increase




Consequently, a city may intend to increase efficiency but fail to do so.
Thus, one commentator observed:
The private market provides remarkably well for consumer idiosyncra-
sies ....
In the private sector, people vote with their dollars; given a mini-
mum number of others with similar tastes and constrained by the re-
sources at their command, they effectively maximize their welfare. In
the public sector, however, signals are not transmitted as clearly, and
both determining what citizens' wishes are and judging whether citi-
zens' welfare is maximized are difficult.2 56
The question is whether this observation leads to the conclusion that
municipalities should be liable under the antitrust laws for actions that
are intended to increase efficiency but in fact reduce it. The answer is no,
principally because the same reasons that make it difficult for a city to
assess consumer preferences also make it difficult for anyone to deter-
mine that efficiency has been reduced.
Suppose a sleepy island municipality is invaded by hordes of vacation-
ers each summer.257 For transportation and amusement, the vacationers
rent mopeds, two-wheeled motorized noise makers. They swarm around
the island, creating a buzzing racket that annoys everyone except those
not themselves riding around annoying everyone else. The city deter-
mines that the mopeds are producing negative externalities and that if
the total social cost were imposed upon the riders, fewer mopeds would
be operated. The city might attempt to increase efficiency in a number of
ways.258 It might estimate the number of mopeds that would be operated
if private cost equalled social cost, and simply order suppliers to restrict
the number of vehicles offered to a specified number. It might take over
the moped concession itself, prohibit new entry, and itself supply the re-
stricted amount. It might estimate the cost per moped imposed upon
society and levy a tax in that amount, thereby increasing the cost of
moped riding and reducing the amount.
How can a court decide whether consumer welfare has been increased
or decreased? The decision cannot depend upon the presence or absence
of a monopoly profit. If the city restricts the number of mopeds that can
be rented to the number that precisely reflects the externalities, the sup-
plier may reap a monopoly profit, but efficiency would be increased nev-
ertheless. Whenever social cost exceeds private cost, forcing price
somehow to reflect social cost generates the possibility of a monopoly
profit.259 The existence of a monopoly profit is an irrelevant economic
256. W. Neenan, supra note 248, at 70. See J. Due & A. Friedlaender, supra note 244,
at 25-61.
257. See Mopeds Spur Secession Talk on Block Island, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1984, at
Al, col. 2.
258. See R. Haveman, supra note 244, at 39-42.
259. See supra note 255.
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detail.2" Likewise, the decision cannot depend upon the identity of the
recepient of any monopoly profit earned. In the hypothetical, restricting
the output of the private supplier would allow him to earn a monopoly
profit; condemning the business or taxing moped use would allow the
city to reap the profit. Each device, however, may have exactly the same
impact on efficiency. Further, because efficiency may be enhanced by per-
mitting a supplier to earn a monopoly profit, it would not be surprising if
a supplier brought to the city's attention a proposed solution to the prob-
lem of external costs that would produce a benefit for himself. It is im-
possible to conclude that the solution reduced efficiency merely because
it was proposed by a private party who gained from it.
About all a court could do is simply disagree with the decision and
find that the city misestimated the magnitude of the externalities. The
city may have, of course. The market may have produced more than an
optimum amount of moped use, but the city might reduce the amount so
far below the optimum that a greater social cost results. To allow an
antitrust court to make this determination, though, is to allow it to per-
form a task it is not equipped to accomplish. However intractable a
problem measuring consumer wants and social costs is, it is generally
more amenable to political than to judicial resolution.26'
This hypothetical suggests another important characteristic of exter-
nalities: They change. An externality today may not be one tomorrow.
More importantly for present purposes, something that produces an ex-
ternal cost on a resort island may produce a lesser cost or no cost at all in
a metropolis. A moped might intrude upon one's solitude at a beach
house but go unnoticed in midtown Manhattan. A gasoline station built
in a neighborhood of Winnetka might be an eyesore, whereas the same
gasoline station in East St. Louis might be a garden spot. Thus, a small
governmental entity will sometimes be in a better position than a large
one to measure and correct for externalities. Residents of Winnetka are
more likely to be able to prove to the city council than to the Illinois
legislature that a gas station will injure them, and the city council is bet-
ter suited to measuring the burden and adjusting for it than is the legisla-
ture.262 Of course, some activities will impose externalities only beyond a
city's borders, and in such cases a larger governmental unit would be
required to take appropriate corrective action. 263 This fact suggests that
260. See R. Bork, supra note 1, at 114-15 (externalities involve other important factors
that should be legislatively addressed).
261. Professor, now Judge, Bork, for example, recognizes that the market falters when
economic activity produces negative externalities. R. Bork, supra note 1, at 114. He
asserts that externalities should be taken into account not by antitrust courts, but by the
legislature, though he does not specify at which level. Allowing municipalities to provide
for externalities, which would require immunizing them from antitrust liability, seems
consistent with Bork's view.
262. See J. Due & A. Friedlaender, supra note 244, at 486-87.
263. Pollution is a classic example of an externality that flows beyond municipal, state
and even national boundaries. See W. Baumol & W. Oates, Economics, Environmental
Policy, and the Quality of Life 225-28 (1979); see also J. Due & A. Friedlaender, supra
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immunity should not be conferred only on municipalities, but it does not
weaken the argument that municipalities as well as states should be
immune.
Further, if a city incorrectly measures or responds to externalities, and
antitrust remedies are unavailable, citizens are not helpless. Purchasers
may be able to vote with their dollars, but citizens can vote with their
voices and their feet. 2" They can elect new representatives or move to
different towns. The limitations of the political remedy for inefficient mu-
nicipal conduct will be addressed later.265 This is not to say that competi-
tion among municipal governments eliminates the possibility of
consumer injury by municipalities.266 Rather, it is meant to suggest that
the amount of harm to allocative efficiency that any town can do is finite.
In summary, when the market fails, a city may act intentionally to
interfere with competition in order to increase efficiency. If the city suc-
ceeds, it is clear that it should not be exposed to antitrust liability. If,
however, the city fails and produces a result that is less efficient than the
market would have produced, it still should not be exposed to such liabil-
ity because an antitrust court is not equipped to determine whether the
city has succeeded or failed. The fact that the city's acts are intended to
correct for market failure and to increase consumer welfare should be
enough to make that city immune from antitrust attack.
3. Municipal Action to Promote a Value Other Than Efficiency
The third way in which a city might affect competition is by acting to
promote a goal other than allocative efficiency and with no intent to gen-
erate monopoly profits. The major objectives other than efficiency that a
city might pursue are the redistribution of wealth and the protection of
citizens from their own erroneous decisions.267 If a municipality imposes
note 244, at 485-89 (the theoretically optimal structure would assign to the federal gov-
ernment those activities with benefits that are nationwide in scope while other activities
would be allocated to governmental units coinciding in size with the group that directly
benefits from the service involved).
264. See J. Due & A. Friedlaender, supra note 244, at 46-51; W. Hirsch, supra note
244, at 18-24; W. Neenan, supra note 248, at 59-67; Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 65 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 416-24 (1956). See generally J. Buchanan, Public
Finance in Democratic Process (1967) (discussion of the delegation of fiscal decisions
from the electorate to its elected representatives); A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loy-
alty (1970) (voicing dissatisfaction or exiting the process discussed as economic and polit-
ical alternatives).
265. See infra notes 289-311 and accompanying text.
266. See infra notes 345-51 and accompanying text.
267. See G. Stigler, supra note 244, at 104. Although Stigler views the protection of
individuals from their own erroneous decisions as an efficiency objective, id. at 108-10, I
prefer, for expositional clarity, to assume that consumer judgments are always correct.
Therefore, if consumers are forced to engage in a transaction that they would otherwise
voluntarily avoid, that transaction is inefficient, even though the state believes that their
decisions are erroneous and that the transaction would increase efficiency. For example,




an income tax to fund welfare services, it is acting to redistribute wealth.
If a pool hall is built in River City, ya got trouble; pool is the work of the
devil and people, well, they can't help themselves and ought to be pro-
tected.268 An ordinance excluding such establishments from the town
would be motivated by a desire to protect people from their own errors.
An action that succeeds in accomplishing a nonefficiency objective
may or may not have an effect on efficiency. 269 A tax system might ac-
complish a redistribution of wealth without reducing allocative effi-
ciency. Suppose, however, that a city decides to promote the welfare of
minority-owned businesses in an effort to alleviate the burden of historic
racial discrimination. It grants an exclusive contract to a minority firm to
provide ambulance services at a stipulated price fifteen percent higher
than the next highest bid proposing the identical service. The agreed-
upon price might generate a profit, or it might represent no economic
profit at all-the firm might simply be relatively inefficient.270 In either
case, efficiency is harmed as a by-product of an action designed to redis-
tribute wealth.
The antitrust laws clearly have no relevance when the city promotes a
nonefficiency objective at no expense to consumer welfare. When the
city's actions incidentally injure consumer welfare, the possibility of anti-
trust liability arises. Since the end of the era of substantive due process,
decisions of subordinate governmental units have not been amenable to
federal preemption merely on the ground that they are unwise,27'
though they will be overturned if they violate some independent constitu-
tional mandate.27 2 At the heart of this principle is the idea that in a
democracy, people ought to be able to decide their own fate. They ought
to be able to choose the values that they will pursue and the means by
which to pursue them, as long as those choices do not conflict with the
preeminent directives of the constitution. Nothing in this concept implies
that the right of subordinate self-government should be limited to states.
Efficiency is a noble objective, but if the good fathers of River City wish
to sacrifice some efficiency in order to prevent people from dropping their
souls into the devil's sidepocket, the federal government should let them
do it. The political process, though not perfect, should usualiy work tol-
erably well to ensure that the decisions made represent the will of the
majority. 273 And frustrated pool players can always move to Cedar
Rapids.
Implicit in the notion that the political process will maximize the wel-
fare of citizens is the requirement that the electorate benefitting from a
268. See generally M. Wilson, Ya Got Trouble (1962) (from "The Music Man").
269. For a good summary of the efficiency effects of taxation, see N. Singer, supra note
244, at 112-85.
270. See infra notes 275-88 and accompanying text.
271. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 443-48 (2d ed. 1983).
272. See id. at 585-86.
273. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
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political decision be the same electorate that is burdened by it. As will be
discussed later, this is not always the case; in those situations there is an
argument under the antitrust laws for preempting decisions that reduce
allocative efficiency, regardless of their purpose. 274 This Article rejects
that argument, but even if it were accepted, it is important to note that it
does not constitute an argument for supplanting a governmental decision
that reduces efficiency when the burdens of that choice fall solely upon
the electorate.
4. Municipal Action to Generate Monopoly Profits
The final way in which a city might affect competition is by a deliber-
ate act to generate a monopoly profit. Any monopoly profit produced can
flow to one or more of only three groups: city officials, private parties or
the public treasury.
a. Personal Gain of City Officials
If a city official acts somehow to impede the market in order to earn a
profit, he would be in blatant violation of the fiduciary duty of a local
government officer not to use his position in any way for private gain. 275
The antitrust laws are not needed to remedy this form of injurious con-
duct, as state laws are perfectly adequate." 6
b. Benefit of Private Parties
For several reasons, a city might act to produce a monopoly profit for
private individuals. Political favors are commonplace. For example, as a
token to a political ally of the mayor, a city might contract with a firm to
repair and maintain parking meters at a price substantially exceeding the
cost of service. More importantly, a growing body of literature has devel-
oped the hypothesis that regulatory agencies come to be captured by
those regulated. 77 In time, if not at the beginning, regulators will act to
benefit the entities under their authority rather than to benefit the public.
It has been suggested, for instance, that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was created at the behest of railroads to shore up a flagging car-
274. See infra notes 291-311 and accompanying text.
275. 2A C. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 22.63, at 22-117 (1984); see 2 C.
Sands & M. Libonati, Local Government Law §§ 10.66, 10.68 (1982).
276. See sources cited in note 275, supra.
277. For a good synopsis of regulatory agencies and their relationships with those reg-
ulated, see M. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (1955); Hunt-
ington, The Marasmus of the ICC The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public
Interest, in Public Administration and Policy: Selected Essays (P. Woll ed. 1966); Leiser-
son, Interest Groups in Administration, in Elements of Public Administration (F. Marx
ed. 1946); Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Govern-
ment Regulation, 15 J. L. & Econ. 151 (1972); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation,
5 Bell J. Econ. & Management Sci. 335 (1974); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula-
tion, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Management Sci. 3 (1971).
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tel.2 78 The same process that leads regulatory commissions to promote
the interests of the firms under their authority might lead city govern-
ments to promote the interests of private firms at the expense of the
public.
To the extent that a government sacrifices the welfare of citizens for
the gain of private business entities, the political process may have
"failed. '2 79 That failure, however, is not the proper object of antitrust
concern. No antitrust liability is imposed upon states for actions that
injure consumer welfare, even if those actions are specifically designed to
benefit private firms. 280 The reason for this, at least in part, is the princi-
ple implicit in the concept of democracy that individuals have a right to
hurt themselves. A government may make decisions which injure the
electorate, but the political process is designed to enlighten the electorate
as to the decisions made and afford it the opportunity to express its dis-
pleasure. This reasoning applies equally to states and cities. In fact, be-
cause cities are smaller, the costs of obtaining information about
government activities may be lower, producing a more knowledgeable
electorate. The citizens may also be proportionately better represented.
The political mechanism may therefore function to remedy injuries more
effectively at the municipal than at the state level. In short, as long as the
burdens imposed on consumers by city action designed to favor private
firms at the citizens' expense fall upon the electorate, a qualification that
will be discussed later,281 application of the antitrust laws is unnecessary
and inappropriate.
c. Municipal Action for Benefit of the Public
A city might act to generate a monopoly profit for the public treasury.
Whenever it does, it is imposing a form of taxation.282 For instance,
some municipalities historically have followed a policy of operating their
own electric distribution systems and pricing to maximize profit in order
278. See G. Kolko, Railroads and Regulation 1877-1916 (1965).
279. "Failed" is used here in a specific sense. The government, which exists to promote
the public welfare, can be said to "fail" in some substantive sense if it favors private
interests at the expense of the public. Of course, the "public" interest is an aggregation of
private interests. Government decisions almost invariably have different impacts upon
different citizens. It is the purpose of governments to promote the welfare of some groups
at the expense of others. According to this analysis, therefore, the government does not
"fail" when it fulfills its function by favoring some private interests at the expense of
others. Whether the particular private interest group served should have been served is a
normative judgment about which reasonable people may differ. Thus, the only meaning-
ful way to judge the success or failure of a government is not by its product, but by its
process, and as long as a decision is produced by a process that is deemed sound, it cannot
be a failure. If the democratic political process produces a result that favors private inter-
ests at the expense of consumer welfare, there is no "failure."
280. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
281. See infra notes 291-311 and accompanying text.
282. See J. Due, Government Finance: Economics of the Public Sector 355 (4th ed.
1968); W. Hirsch, supra note 244, at 35.
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to generate funds for the public treasury.283 In this example, the service
provided is a natural monopoly. The same policy, however, could be ap-
plied to the provision of a private good that is not subject to natural
monopoly conditions. Suppose emergency ambulance service is provided
by several private firms at competitive prices. The city decides to provide
the service itself and charge a user fee. It excludes the competing compa-
nies and sets a monopoly price. If that course of action were forbidden,
the city would have a ready and adequate alternative. It could allow the
private firms to continue operating and impose an excise tax on ambu-
lance use equal to the monopoly profit available.284 It is important to see
that the impact on allocative efficiency is exactly the same in both
instances.
Depending upon the supply and demand characteristics of the good
involved, an excise tax, or a monopoly price imposed to generate public
revenue, is likely to reduce allocative efficiency in a way that another tax
producing the same amount of government revenue, such as an income
tax, is not.2 85 For this reason, this kind of municipal conduct may injure
consumer welfare. The question, however, is whether the antitrust laws
should be available to remedy this injury. It would be entirely arbitrary
to use antitrust laws to prohibit a city from excluding competition and
thereafter charging a monopoly price, but not use them to preclude the
city from imposing an excise tax that is designed to achieve the same
purpose and has the same effect on consumer welfare. It does not appear
that anyone has seriously suggested that the federal antitrust laws can be
applied to strike down a municipal excise tax. An ill-advised and ineffi-
cient municipal tax policy is subject to political constraints, 8 6 the direc-
283. J. Due, supra note 282, at 355.
284. An excise tax "is a levy on a narrow range of exchanges, so the tax base is defined
as the buying or selling of a particular good or service." W. Hirsch, supra note 244, at 93
(emphasis in original); see N. Singer, supra note 244, at 96-97.
285. See N. Singer, supra note 244, at 156-57, 159-64. Professor Singer writes: "An
income tax is nearly neutral in its effects upon the allocation of resources, although...
it does discriminate against saving, compared to a tax on consumption expenditures. An
excise tax is not neutral, because it makes the taxed commodity relatively more expensive
than before the tax. The distortion of resource allocation caused by excise taxation can
impose a cost on taxpayers over and above the revenue cost of the tax." N. Singer, Public
Microeconmics 159 (Ist ed. 1972).
286. One might distinguish between direct forms of taxation and taxation through mo-
nopoly charges on the ground that the political process is more likely to be an effective
check in the former than in the latter case. The argument would be that the costs of
information borne by the electorate are lower when taxation is direct than when it is
indirect. Thus, the average citizen perceives that he is being taxed when he pays a charge
labeled "sales tax" and may voice his assessment of it through the political process. But
he may not realize that five percent of his bill for electric service represents surplus reve-
nue for the city.
It is not at all clear that this is a serious problem. Information can be expected to be
acquired and disseminated by contesting parties in the political process. For instance, a
candidate for city council would likely raise such an issue in a campaign against the
incumbent. Further, the citizens' exposure to the activities of surrounding cities is likely
to alert the people to the effect of their government's decisions sufficiently to allow them
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tions of the state287 and the mandates of the federal constitution, 28 8 but it
is not amenable to antitrust challenge. All municipal conduct designed to
secure a monopoly profit for the public treasury should be treated in the
same way.
C. Efficacy of the Political Remedy
As already explained, a city may act knowingly to impair allocative
efficiency in four situations: as a by-product of an act designed to pro-
mote some value other than efficiency; in order to benefit city officials
privately; in order to benefit private firms; and, by imposing an inefficient
form of taxation. Only in these cases could application of the antitrust
laws possibly be justified. In the second situation, state laws imposing a
fiduciary duty on city officials present an entirely adequate remedy. In
the other three situations, however, I have argued that the antitrust laws
should not be applied, in part because if the electorate perceives the city's
actions to be detrimental, the political process constitutes an alternative
and adequate remedy. If the city's conduct is perceived by the electorate
to be desirable despite the decrease in efficiency, there is no "harm" that
to complain through the political process. If a resident of City A pays higher electric
rates than her friend in City B, she may not understand why she is paying so much, but
she will understand enough to be able to protest.
287. In the area of municipal taxation, the need for adequate state authorization is
particularly acute. For instance, one commentator has written: "[T]he overwhelming
weight of authority is to the effect that municipal corporations and other local govern-
ment entities do not have an inherent power of taxation." 2A C. Antieau, supra note 275,
at § 21.00 (emphasis in original). The same author went on to state:
Courts in the non-home-rule states, as well as in the "legislative" home-rule
states, generally follow the rule that only a legislative act plainly and unmistak-
ably delegating the specific power of taxation claimed will be recognized as con-
ferring the power upon a local government entity ....
Even in the constitutional home-rule states, courts have occasionally applied
the same rule.
Id. at § 21.01.
Further, courts generally hold that in determining whether a particular tax is within
municipal power, it is not the designation given to the tax by the municipality which is
determinative of the nature or validity of the tax; rather, the court will determine the
character of the tax according to its incidents, operations and effect. Id. at § 21.07. This
principle has led courts to strike down certain municipal licensing schemes on the ground
that "the power to impose license taxes ... will not be implied from a municipal power
to regulate by the licensing technique." Id. at § 21.04. Thus, a city in New Jersey, a
home-rule state, enacted an ordinance as a revenue-raising device which imposed license
fees on local businesses. A state court struck down the ordinance on the ground that it
was unauthorized, despite a state statute that permitted license fees to be imposed "for
revenue." Salomon v. Jersey City, 12 N.J. 379, 392, 97 A.2d 405, 412 (1953). To the
extent that a municipality suppresses competition in order to acquire a monopoly over a
service it provides and for which it thereafter charges a monopoly price, a state court may
be able to recognize the conduct for what it is, a form of taxation, and invalidate it unless
it is specifically authorized.
288. See infra notes 301-311 and accompanying text, where the effect of the Commerce
Clause is discussed. Other constitutional provisions, such as the Equal Protection or Due
Process clauses, might conceivably affect a municipal tax policy. See I P. Areeda & D.
Turner, supra note 33, at § 219.
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should be remedied. This claim-that, with governmental action, the
political process obviates the need for the antitrust laws- bears closer
attention.
At the very least, the political process is a check upon governmental
actions that injure consumer welfare, a process which is not directly
available as a check upon private behavior that injures consumer welfare.
Thus, it would not be arbitrary to distinguish between anticompetitive
governmental and private behavior on this basis alone, and therefore to
confine the application of the antitrust laws to the private sector.
The political process is not an infallible system for expressing majority
preferences. Kenneth Arrow has demonstrated that under certain condi-
tions that may be common in the American political process, a majority
vote will not reflect the will of the majority.289 Further, the political pro-
cess surely may operate to harm a minority of the electorate for the bene-
fit of the majority or even a different minority, and such a result can
occur whether the disadvantaged minority objects or assents to the deci-
sion. For example, a city may decide to provide a shelter for drug addicts
with revenue gained from an excise tax on the use of a municipal golf
course. Golfers are likely to be a minority of the city's population and
they may or may not object to the burden of wealth redistribution or
deadweight loss imposed upon them. Whatever flaws the political process
has, however, we are generally willing to tolerate them and abide by the
results of that process. Certainly the flaws of a political system that pro-
duces validly enacted federal and state laws are insufficient warrant for
refusing to enforce those laws. It is not apparent that these flaws are any
more serious at the local than at the federal or state levels. In short,
whatever the shortcomings of democratic rule, they are usually not a
sufficient ground for refusing to enforce the product of that process,
whatever the size of the political entity involved.
When a municipal government decides to impair efficiency, however,
there is a particular reason to question whether the will of the people has
been served. The costs of the action may be imposed upon consumers
who are not represented in the electorate. For instance, suppose a city, as
a way of promoting affirmative action, awards to an inefficient minority
firm an exclusive contract to provide food concession services at a munic-
ipal airport. Or suppose the city awards that contract to a local private
firm, intending that the firm reap monopoly profits, as a way of generat-
ing political support from the firm without seriously burdening other
constituents. Or suppose the city chooses to provide the services itself at
a monopoly price, as a way of generating revenue for the public treasury.
The individuals paying inflated prices would at least include nonresident
travelers.
289. K. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1951); see J. Due & A.
Friedlaender, supra note 244, at 66-73; Riker, Arrow's Theorem and Some Examples of




Arguably, in these cases, the burden of the city's decision falls dispro-
portionately on consumers who have no voice in the political process that
produces the decision. The political process fails in the sense that the city
might have acted in a different way had it been politically accountable to
the individuals burdened by its decision. The problem is real, but it
should be confined before the solution is addressed. For the political pro-
cess to work tolerably well, the burdens of a governmental decision need
not fall exclusively on the electorate. It is not important at all that the
benefits be enjoyed by the electorate, though usually they will be. It is
only important that a sufficient proportion of the total burden falls upon
members of the electorate who do not perceive themselves as gaining off-
setting benefits, so that they will have an incentive to oppose the decision
politically. For example, in the airport concession hypothetical, munici-
pal residents as well as nonresidents use the airport and presumably
purchase food. Perhaps, however, the affected residents represent a small
proportion of the total number burdened, and therefore, would make a
correspondingly weak protest. Indeed, they may not protest at all if they
believe the extra fifty cents they pay for a hot dog reduces their property
taxes.
Suppose, however, that a city acts in such a way that taxi service is
priced at a monopoly level. It is not at all clear that residents represent so
small a proportion of cab riders that they would be unable to object ade-
quately in the political system. The locus of the burdens imposed by a
city's inefficient actions will fall along a continuum between residents ex-
clusively and nonresidents exclusively. The impact must fall decidedly
toward the nonresident end for there to be a serious deficiency in the
political mechanism. In reality, the impact of most decisions will fall
somewhere between the extremes, and it is not at all clear how many
actual instances fall within the danger zone.
In those situations in which the political system cannot be trusted, the
issue is whether the antitrust laws ought to be applied. At the very least,
the above analysis suggests that if the antitrust laws should ever apply to
municipalities, they should apply only when the burden of an anticompe-
titive municipal action falls disproportionately on nonresidents. For rea-
sons of doctrinal purity, however, it would be better to immunize
municipalities from antitrust challenge even in these instances, and in-
stead subject them to challenge through other legal paths.2 90
1. State Law Limitations
Whenever a municipality acts to impose a disproportionate burden on
nonresidents within the same state, state laws should be the appropriate
method of attack. A state undoubtedly has the authority to prohibit its
municipalities from acting in such a way as to injure nonresidents. Pro-
fessor Antieau has stated the general principle: "The rule followed every-
290. See infra notes 291-310 and accompanying text.
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where in the United States is to the effect that the state legislatures have
complete control over local governments, except as limited by the consti-
tutional clauses-federal and state .... As early as 1876, the
Supreme Court noted:
A municipal corporation, in the exercise of all its duties, including
those most strictly local or internal, is but a department of the State.
The legislature may give it all the powers such a being is capable of
receiving, making it a miniature State within its locality. Again: it may
strip it of every power, leaving it a corporation in name only . 292
A legislature's power over a municipality may be limited, at least in
theory, by state constitutional "home rule" provisions. These provisions
vary, but generally they grant to municipalities some amount of power to
govern themselves.293 A typical provision states: "Cities are hereby em-
powered to determine their local affairs and government including the
levying of taxes, excises, fees, charges and other exactions . ,294 Not
only do home rule provisions serve as a source of municipal power, but
they also theoretically serve as a limitation on state legislative control.2 "
For present purposes, however, the limitation is illusory. All home rule
provisions restrict a municipality's power to matters of local, rather than
general or state, concern.296 Though the test for distinguishing between
matters of local and general concern is not sharp, the most important
factor is the effect of a city's action on people outside the city.297 Profes-
sor Antieau summarizes: "[I]f the effect of the regulation or the adminis-
tration of a particular matter is likely to be felt by a considerable number
of people outside the city and in a rather strong degree, courts are proba-
bly going to conclude that the concern is for the state."2 9 Thus, the
power of a state legislature to prohibit a city from injuring the welfare of
citizens located in other municipalities within the state is not abridged by
constitutional home rule provisions.
The almost unlimited control that a state legislature has over its mu-
nicipalities can and has been exercised to prohibit a municipality from
injuring nonresidents. For instance, in State ex rel. McElroy v. City of
Akron,299 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the state legislature had val-
idly prohibited municipalities from imposing license fees for the privilege
of operating watercraft on waters owned by the municipality. 30° When a
291. 1 C. Antieau, supra note 275, at § 2.00.
292. Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540, 544 (1876).
293. See 1 C. Antieau, supra note 275, at § 3.00; 1 C. Sands & M. Libonati, supra note
275, at § 4.02; S. Sato & A. Van Alstyne, State and Local Government Law 134-43 (2d
ed. 1977).
294. Kan. Corst. art. 12, § 5(b) (1859, amended 1960).
295. 1 C. Antieau, supra note 275, at § 3.01.
296. Id. at § 3.21.
297. Id. at § 3.40.
298. Id.
299. 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E.2d 26 (1962).
300. Id. at 195, 181 N.E.2d at 30.
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municipality acts to burden nonresidents living within the state, the mat-
ter is one of internal state concern, which the state is entirely capable of
resolving without resort to federal antitrust remedies.
2. Commerce Clause Limitations
A municipality may act in such a way that a substantial and dispro-
portionate burden is imposed on nonresidents of the state. In those cases,
the city's actions should be held to be pre-empted by the Commerce
Clause of the federal Constitution.30 ' The Commerce Clause not only is a
source of power for Congress to pass laws that pre-empt inconsistent lo-
cal governmental actions under the Supremacy Clause; it also, by its own
force, limits local governmental actions that impose an excessive burden
on the national economy. 30 2 It would be folly to attempt to discuss the
Commerce Clause in even minimal detail, or to trace its historical devel-
opment, in the course of this Article. Rather, the Article will suggest a
test, based on a single case, to determine when municipal conduct injuri-
ous to consumer welfare should be pre-empted. Needless to say, this ex-
plores not even the tip of the iceberg.
In Evansville- Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Air-
lines,30 3 the Supreme Court held that a municipality did not violate the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution by charging one dollar per com-
mercial airline passenger for enplaning at the municipal airport. The city
had imposed the charge in order to help defray the cost of airport con-
struction and maintenance. 3°4 The Court deemed it crucial that the
charges reflected "a fair, if imperfect, approximation of the use of facili-
ties for whose benefit they [were] imposed ' 305 and were not "excessive in
relation to costs incurred by the taxing authorities. 30 6 This reasoning
implies that if a municipality acts in such a way as to create a substantial
burden on out-of-state residents that is not reasonably related to services
provided to those individuals, the act will be pre-empted by the Com-
merce Clause. Thus, if a city imposes a substantial excise tax that falls on
nonstate residents, the amount of the tax must bear some relationship to
the amount of services provided to them. The same reasoning could be
used to establish the following principle: If a city restrains competition in
such a way that an inefficient supplier is permitted to charge an excessive
price, or a private firm or the city is permitted to earn a monopoly profit,
and a significant proportion of the burden is imposed on nonstate resi-
dents, the action will be pre-empted by the Commerce Clause if the bur-
301. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
302. For an excellent summary of the application of the Commerce Clause to state
anticompetitive activities, see 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 220b; J.
Nowak, R. Rotunda, & J. Young, supra note 271, at 266-75.
303. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
304. Id. at 709.
305. Id. at 717.
306. Id. at 719.
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den substantially exceeds any benefits of the services provided." 7
Comparing burdens to benefits will, of course, result in only a rough
approximation. Some imprecision, however, is inescapable in any stan-
dard, and may be a virtue as well as a vice. If a standard proscribed all
municipal conduct that adversely affected out-of-state consumers, the
test could be applied precisely, but it would pre-empt virtually all munic-
ipal conduct that reduced efficiency. It would allow massive federal in-
trusion into primarily local affairs. In a mobile society, it is hard to
imagine a municipal activity that will not affect some out-of-state con-
sumers. If a standard proscribed all municipal conduct that imposed a
disproportionate burden on nonresidents and reduced efficiency, however
slightly, a detailed examination of the efficiency effects of even trivial in-
juries to consumer welfare would be required. Any practical test will
have to be somewhat imprecise about both the necessary degree of eco-
nomic harm and the identity of the injured parties. The proposed stan-
dard would allow a court to dispose of cases quickly when a cursory
examination of market conditions discloses either that the amount of any
potential harm is small or that the impact falls primarily on state resi-
dents. If, for example, the overcharge represents a monopoly profit to or
the cost of inefficiency of a private firm, there will be no offsetting benefit
provided by the city. The proposed standard would nevertheless permit a
court to dismiss a suit based on such conduct, and avoid the expense of
litigation, as long as the harm caused is sufficiently trivial that federal
intervention is not justified.30 8
The proposed test, which would allow municipal actions to stand un-
less they impose a substantial and disproportionate burden on out-of-
state residents, would probably not invalidate many actual instances of
municipal conduct. It would seem that a Commerce Clause standard,
which has been applied to give states substantial leeway in their con-
duct,309 would pre-empt even fewer municipal actions than state actions.
A municipality is likely to have less actual economic power to injure out-
307. Areeda and Turner state that the test for determining Commerce Clause pre-
emption of state anticompetitive conduct requires balancing the burden on out-of-state
interests against the extent of the legitimate local benefits. 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner,
supra note 33, at 220b. This test, which the authors assert is the one in fact applied by
the Court, does not vary significantly from the one espoused in this Article. Both are
consistent with Supreme Court precedent; I believe, however, that the formulation
presented in this Article is preferable. In any case, it is important to limit the inquiry into
the burden on out-of-state interests to the burden imposed on out-of-state consumers.
That is the interest damaged by conduct reducing efficiency.
308. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359 (1943), the Court recognized this potential
applicability of Commerce Clause pre-emption. Ironically, the Court held that the raisin
price-fixing program was not invalid under the Commerce Clause even though ninety-five
percent of the California raisin crop left the state. Id. at 368. Parker is a case in which
the burden imposed on nonstate residents was probably sufficient to justify pre-emption.
See Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 39-40.
309. For example, the Court held that the raisin proration program in Parker did not
unduly burden interstate commerce. 317 U.S. 341, 367-68 (1943); see also Pike v. Bruce
Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (state regulations with an incidental effect on interstate
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of-state consumers than is a state. The significance of Commerce Clause
pre-emption, however, is not that it will often operate, but that it is capa-
ble of suppressing those rare instances of municipal conduct damaging
consumer welfare that are not amenable to correction through state law
or the political process.
One might argue that the test proposed in this Article for determining
when the Commerce Clause will pre-empt anticompetitive municipal
conduct should instead be used to determine when the Sherman Act will
apply.3 O The proper test, however, for determining whether conduct vio-
lates the Sherman Act is whether it injures consumer welfare. 3' 1 It fo-
cuses upon the fact that allocative efficiency is impaired, not upon the
identity of the consumers injured. The Commerce Clause, on the other
hand, does focus upon the location of the economic incidents of munici-
pal behavior, and that is the proper focus in determining whether munici-
pal conduct will be allowed to stand. Thus, even though a municipality
might injure consumer welfare, its actions should be left undisturbed as
long as most of the consumers allegedly injured are members of the mu-
nicipal electorate.
D. Immunity Rather Than Liability
At this point, one might agree with the substance of the above analysis
but argue that it provides only a framework for determining substantive
municipal antitrust liability, not a reason for blanket immunity. The is-
sue of immunity is distinct from that of liability on the merits, and when
a municipality injures consumer welfare, it can be argued that the polit-
ical mechanism may not provide as effective a remedy as that provided
by the antitrust laws.
This argument has two major flaws. First, it incorrectly assumes that
injury to consumer welfare should be prohibited even when an electorate
chooses to sacrifice efficiency, for whatever reason, and bears the entire
burden of lost efficiency. The antitrust laws have no business interfering
with that kind of local political decision.3" 2 Second, it assumes that anti-
trust courts can and will accurately distinguish instances in which a mu-
nicipality injures consumer welfare from instances in which municipal
conduct has a positive or neutral impact on efficiency. If a municipality
restricts the output of some product demonstrating negative externalities,
so that price equals marginal social cost, it will have increased effi-
ciency. 31 3 Yet, its action may look very much like a price-fixing arrange-
commerce will be upheld unless the burden on commerce "is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits").
310. See Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 45-46. Areeda and Turner have asserted that
using the Commerce Clause and other nonantitrust remedies for anticompetitive state
conduct is superior to imposing antitrust liability on state agencies and related private
parties. 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 220e.
311. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 273, 279-81, 289 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 252-54, 257-60 and accompanying text.
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ment. In both cases, price increases and output decreases. Of course,
when private firms act to limit output, they will almost certainly injure
consumer welfare.314 But an antitrust court is virtually incapable of de-
termining when a municipality's action designed to account for externali-
ties increases or decreases efficiency. If a city prohibits the construction
of a third gasoline station at an intersection, or requires used car lots to
be closed on Sundays, it may look like an anticompetitive restraint, but it
may have no effect at all on consumer welfare. Indeed, if a city forces all
fruit dealers to locate in one area of the wholesale food center, it may
look like an actionable restraint even though it facilitates the operation of
the market.
The Boulder case315 provides a particularly stark example of a court
misinterpreting municipal conduct that was designed to and did enhance
efficiency. The city acted to facilitate competition by restraining the in-
cumbent cable television company from expanding its business in a way
that would have precluded new entry, until competitive bids could be
tendered and assessed. Yet the district court entered a preliminary in-
junction against the city, holding that the city's conduct "in reasonable
probability will be declared to be unlawful under the antitrust laws." 3 6
Courts are likely to impose antitrust liability on a municipality for con-
duct that does not injure consumer welfare because much of what a mu-
nicipality does has no close analog in the private sector? 1 7 For example,
Schwinn Bicycle Company can establish an exclusive outlet for Schwinn
Bicycles in Champaign, Illinois, but it cannot prevent Raleigh Bicycle
Company from opening its own dealership. Champaign, however, can
designate the Acme Ambulance Company as the exclusive provider of
emergency services in the city and prohibit the Jiffy Ambulance Com-
pany from operating within city boundaries.
Since the earliest decisions under the Sherman Act, the quality and
sophistication of antitrust opinions have increased. This is due in part to
progress in the science of economics, but also in part to the fact that
each new decision has had another prior decision on which to build.
Whatever criticism might be directed at the quality of current judicial
enforcement of the antitrust laws, courts today are considerably more
adept at discerning price-fixing arrangements than courts were fifty years
314. But see supra note 255.
315. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), dis-
cussed supra at notes 195-217 and accompanying text.
316. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 1040 (D.
Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
317. Professor Areeda states: "[Many challenged governmental activities-such as
zoning decisions, franchising and licensing, and matters related to the management of
public facilities-seldom, if ever, violate the antitrust laws [substantively], even though
they incidentally affect market competition." 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, ¢
212.3, at 52-53 (1982 supp.) (footnote omitted). As the above discussion indicates, I be-
lieve that he vastly underestimates the difficulty of identifying injuries to consumer wel-
fare. See also 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 216 (absence of immunity
does not indicate presence of antitrust offense).
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ago. If municipal antitrust liability is possible, courts will start near the
beginning, without an inherited body of specifically relevant teaching,
and they can be expected to err often and significantly.
How one feels about bearing the cost of error while knowledge is accu-
mulated has a lot to do with how large one believes the burden on con-
sumer welfare imposed by cities would be without the availability of
antitrust liability. Because the political process is generally effective in
correcting conduct injurious to consumer welfare, and because such con-
duct represents a relatively small proportion of the total amount of con-
duct affecting competition, the cost of erroneous judicial decisions
imposing liability is not justified.
Furthermore, the threat of erroneous imposition of liability can be ex-
pected to chill municipalities from engaging in conduct that would either
increase efficiency or have no impact on efficiency while promoting some
other goal. This is an additional cost of exposing municipalities to anti-
trust liability that would not be borne if such entities were simply im-
mune. The chilling effect was much greater when the potential antitrust
remedies to which municipalities were exposed included treble damages.
Before passage of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,18 some
commentators suggested that treble damages would have been an inap-
propriate sanction to impose on a city. But others expressed doubt that
there was any legislative authority for withholding the remedy.319
Though the threat of damages will no longer chill municipal action, the
prospects of defending an antitrust suit and the entry of an adverse judi-
cial decree for prospective relief continue to constitute a burden that may
well be sufficient to deter a city from acting.
Finally, the cost of potential municipal liability will include the cost of
litigating cases in which the city is found innocent, cases in which the
city is incorrectly found guilty, and cases which are brought merely to
induce settlement and are dropped prior to judicial resolution. Antitrust
litigation is notoriously expensive. Additionally, the uncertain state of
substantive antitrust doctrine will not only result in a large number of
erroneous decisions, but will also reduce the probability of settlement.32
318. 47 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep (BNA) No. 1187, at 753 (Oct. 25, 1984); see id.,
No. 1186, at 716-18, 737 (Oct. 18, 1984).
319. See infra notes 336-37 and accompanying text.
320. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 434-41 (2d ed. 1977). An excellent
demonstration that potential liability will lead to strike suits is provided by Capital Tele-
phone Co. v. City of Schenectady, 560 F. Supp. 207 (N.D.N.Y. 1983). In this case, the
state required a city franchise for the provision of telephone service. Plaintiff petitioned
the city for a franchise to establish a second landline telephone company. Because the
plaintiff provided insufficient information in support of his proposal, and presumably be-
cause local telephone service is currently a natural monopoly, the city denied the request.
The plaintiff then sued the city under, inter alia, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id.
at 208-09. The court correctly granted the city's motion for summary judgment, see id. at
212. The very fact that the city was put to the expense of litigating this ridiculous claim,
however, indicates that potential antitrust liability gives leverage to any person disap-
pointed in transactions with a municipality.
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Taken together, these costs appear greatly to outweigh the increase in
consumer welfare that subjecting municipalities to antitrust liability
might produce.
E. Independent Rather Than Derivative Immunity
The choice, of course, is not between potential liability and blanket
immunity. Municipalities today can acquire immunity, as long as it is
bestowed upon them by states.321 Rather, the question is whether in-
dependent immunity is superior to this kind of derivative immunity. In-
dependent immunity is indeed superior. Requiring a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state authorization of specific conduct, to say
nothing of subsequent supervision, is expensive for both states and mu-
nicipalities. Legislative authorization is not cost-free; it takes time and
consumes resources. Further, the prudent city will have to seek authori-
zation not only for acts that do in fact reduce efficiency, but also for acts
that only appear to reduce efficiency but that may incorrectly be found
by federal judges to violate the antitrust laws. There are 82,290 units of
local government in this country, of which 38,851 are general-purpose
local governments.322 Simple multiplication of the number of municipali-
ties by the number of municipal acts that might appear anticompetitive
suggests the staggering direct costs of requiring specific state
authorization.
Because these costs are so high, municipalities can be expected to
avoid seeking immunity at times, and instead opt to refrain from engag-
ing in activities that would in fact promote efficiency or some other value.
The administrative costs of obtaining immunity will be avoided but at the
price of reduced social welfare. Additionally, some cities will avoid the
costs of acquiring immunity by operating without it, but will suffer the
costs of erroneous liability determinations.
A more subtle but perhaps more significant cost of derivative immu-
nity is its adverse impact on the municipality's sense of autonomy. The
trend in this country has been toward increasing powers of self-govern-
ment for local units, as evidenced by the movement toward home rule.3"3
321. See supra notes 187-214 and accompanying text.
322. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1 Governmental Organization,
1982 Census of Governments VI (1983). The category "general-purpose" local govern-
ments includes counties, municipalities, and townships; it does not include "limited-pur-
pose" local governments, such as school districts and special districts. Id. For purposes
of this Article, the term "municipality" refers generically to all general-purpose, elected
local governments. Whether, for purposes of antitrust immunity, distinctions should be
made among types of general-purpose governments, or how immunity should apply to
limited-purpose governments, is not considered here.
323. As of 1978, 41 states, by constitution, legislation, or both, had granted their mu-
nicipal governments some degree of home rule authority. M. Hill, State Laws Governing
Local Government Structure and Administration 4, 43 (1978). See generally 1 E. Mc-
Quillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §§ 1.40-1.43 (3d ed. 1971) (discussing the
development of home rule and its advantage); 3 C. Sands & M. Libonati, supra note 275,
at § 13.03 (discussing the nature of home rule powers).
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To require state authorization for specific municipal actions is a flagrant
affront to the deeply felt, almost religious conviction that "local people
are best suited to administer local affairs." 324
While the marginal cost of obtaining immunity through the state
rather than independently is great, there is little marginal benefit. If a
city seeks immunity for specific activities that will affect its own resi-
dents, a state may either allow or prohibit those activities. If it allows
them, the result will be no different from what it would have been had
the city been independently immune. If there can be any benefit from
derivative immunity, it would have to be the result of a state's decision
not to authorize conduct. As long as that conduct will burden primarily
municipal residents, a decision by the state to refuse authorization is no
more likely to increase welfare than it is to decrease it. The local political
mechanism is capable of balancing advantages and disadvantages, and
any override of its decision by a higher political entity cannot be pre-
sumed to produce a better result. If the conduct will burden nonmunici-
pal residents, the state can act to disallow it before it is undertaken. 325
The state can act to prohibit the conduct, however, even if the city is
independently immune from the federal antitrust laws. Any benefit de-
rived from requiring prior state authorization will, at best, reduce mini-
mally the time during which a city may injure nonresidents. Thus,
municipal antitrust immunity should be independent rather than
derivative.
F. Municipal Immunization of Others' Conduct
If, as proposed, municipalities are treated exactly like states for pur-
poses of antitrust immunity, a municipality's acts that proximately cause
antitrust injury, like those of a state, would be immune from antitrust
attack. The analysis so far has been directed to that proposition. It is
equally important, however, that municipalities be treated like states
with respect to the authorization prong of the state action doctrine;326 a
municipality must be able to immunize private parties for their acts prox-
imately causing antitrust injury by clearly articulating and affirmatively
expressing a policy contemplating the challenged conduct. The necessity
of an authorization prong stems from the fact that implementation of a
government's policies will often require the participation of private ac-
tors. This is why virtually all state action cases involve "a blend of pri-
vate and public decision making." '327 The crux of immunity is that a
public decision to restrain competition will not invite antitrust challenge.
If a government cannot effect its decision through private parties without
324. 1 E. McQuillin, supra note 323, at § 1.42.
325. See supra notes 291-300 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 137-63 and accompanying text.




exposing them to liability, the government's immunity may be illusory.
These considerations apply to states and municipalities with equal force.
Similar reasons require that legitimate governmental agencies them-
selves be immune for acts proximately causing antitrust injury, as long as
the agencies are operating within the scope of their general authority."' 8
Further, such agencies acting within their authority must be able to con-
fer antitrust immunity on private parties for acts that are consistent with
a clear policy expressed by the agency.329 Efficiency and practicality may
require that a government establish and implement its policies through
agencies as well as private actors. Again, the rationale applies equally to
state and municipal governments.
Conceivably, municipalities could be treated like legitimate state agen-
cies rather than like states. The only relevant difference is that in the
former case, they would not be immune if they acted outside the scope of
authority delegated to them by the legislature, but this difference would
have little real impact. If a city exceeds its delegated authority, it violates
state law and can be punished accordingly. There is no pressing need to
subject it to antitrust liability as well. This observation, of course, also
applies to state agencies, but there is a significant difference between state
agencies and municipalities that justifies different treatment for purposes
of antitrust immunity: The state agency is not directly subject to the
political process, whereas the municipality is.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE CURRENT DOCTRINE OF
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
Given the controversy over municipal antitrust liability during the
past several years, it is not surprising that a number of alternative ap-
proaches to the problem have been offered. Many differ from this Arti-
cle's proposal of blanket immunity; others reach the same conclusion by
different reasoning. A study of them all will not be undertaken here, but
a few have become sufficiently prominent that brief comment is
warranted.
In his concurring opinion in City of Lafayette, Chief Justice Burger
asserted that a city should not be protected from antitrust liability when
it acts in a proprietary capacity.33 Although he did not explicitly say so,
the Chief Justice implied that a city should be immune from liability
when it acts in a governmental capacity. 331 The proprietary/governmen-
tal distinction has a long and inglorious past in the field of municipal tort
liability. 332 That fact alone warns against transposing the doctrine into
328. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 165-85 and accompanying text.
330. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 418-22 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
331. See id. at 432-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
332. The governmental versus proprietary test has proven so unworkable that the
highest courts of 35 states have openly repudiated it. IA C. Antieau, supra note 275, at
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the field of antitrust immunity, lest its failings come along with it. But
there is a stronger, more specific reason for not using the distinction to
determine antitrust liability: It focuses on an irrelevant economic detail.
The antitrust laws are designed to achieve an economic goal: the max-
imization of consumer welfare. To determine whether any conduct vio-
lates these laws, the analysis must focus on the effect of the conduct. A
municipality's actions can have exactly the same effect whether they are
proprietary or governmental. The earlier moped hypothetical illustrates
the point.333 If a city regulates the number of mopeds rented, or levies a
tax on moped use, its actions are governmental. If it instead purchases
the moped concession, prohibits entry, and reduces the number of
mopeds it rents to the public, its actions are proprietary. Yet all three
courses of conduct may be intended to and in fact have exactly the same
effect- a reduction in moped use, coupled with an increase in price.
Nor can any distinction turn upon whether the municipal conduct in-
volves public or private goods.334 Municipalities cannot be confined to
providing or regulating public goods, because forcing externalities to be
internalized is certainly a legitimate function of any government, and as
the moped example demonstrates, externalities can be generated by the
use of private as well as public goods. Besides, the line separating pure
public goods from pure private goods is so vague that any attempt to
discern it in any real case would likely prove intolerably frustrating.335
Thus, the deficiency in the proprietary/governmental distinction as a test
for immunity is that by focusing incorrectly on the character rather than
the effect of municipal conduct, the test elevates form over substance.
Before passage of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, some
commentators had suggested that the antitrust laws be fully applied to
municipalities, except that treble damages be unavailable as a remedy for
municipal violations.336 It might have been that under the law existing at
that time, a court could not have withheld categorically any of the relief
specified by Congress as available for antitrust injuries.337 But Congress
§ 11.40; see W. Prosser and W. Keaton, supra note 73, at 1053-54; accord 4 C. Sands &
M. Libonati, supra note 275, at § 27.03, 27-10 ("It has long been apparent that the gov-
ernmental versus proprietary distinction serves as an incantation for stating results rather
than as a predictable and uniform guide to judicial decisions.").
333. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
335. Professor Neenan has observed: "Local governments provide services that fall
somewhere along a spectrum between [pure] Samuelsonian public goods and purely pri-
vate goods. There is no Cuyahoga County Strategic Air Command, nor are there Little
Rock Thirty-Eight Flavor Ice Cream Shoppes. Services provided by local governments
have a mixed public-private nature. . . ." W. Neenan, supra note 248, at 57-58.
336. See, e.g., 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 33, at 217(a)(1).
337. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 65 n.2
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It will take a considerable feat of judicial gymnastics
to conclude that municipalities are not subject to treble damages to compensate any per-
son 'injured in his business or property.' "); see also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 442-43 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Nor has the Court
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has now resolved the dispute by explicitly shielding municipalities from
damage liability,3 38 and that was unquestionably a good idea. If the bur-
den of anticompetitive conduct falls primarily on municipal residents, it
would be a cruel joke indeed to force a municipality, and consequently its
taxpayers, to pay damages, treble or otherwise, for engaging in conduct
deemed objectionable because it injured those same taxpayers.
Elimination of the damage remedy, however, is not the ideal answer to
the liability problem. With the remedy unavailable, no doubt fewer pri-
vate parties will sue, but surely there will still be suits for injunctive re-
lief. Thus, the costs of acquiring specific state authorization, of erroneous
liability determinations, and of some litigation all remain, and will still
produce no significant benefit.339 In all, elimination of the damage rem-
edy represents progress, but it is only a second best solution, inferior to
the complete elimination of all possibility of antitrust liability.
Justice Rehnquist has drawn a distinction that, though it does not in-
dependently resolve the issue of liability, is so important to a proper anal-
ysis that it should be noted. He has stressed the difference between
exemption and pre-emption.3" Because the problem to be resolved con-
cerns the conflicting pronouncements of different sovereigns, the question
that should be asked with respect to actions of municipalities is whether
they are pre-empted by the Sherman Act through the operation of the
Supremacy Clause.341 The issue is not exemption, because that pertains
to the effect to be given to conflicting pronouncements of the same sover-
eign.342 Thus the Sherman Act should never pre-empt municipal con-
duct, though at times the Commerce Clause should-a distinction
embodied in the blanket immunity analysis. 413 However well-taken his
observation, Justice Rehnquist does not explain wien a municipality's
conduct will be pre-empted, 34 4 and so his analysis is critically
incomplete.
Finally, in the most important and best of the recent articles published
on the topic of state action immunity, Professor Easterbrook has empha-
sized the relevance of competition among governmental units."' 5 Easter-
brook's analysis builds upon the "Tiebout Model," '46 a theory offered by
economist Charles M. Tiebout almost thirty years ago. In essence, Tie-
bout asserted that local government units offer packages of public goods
come to grips with the plainly mandatory language of § 4 of the Clayton Act," which
requires treble damages.).
338. Local Government Antitrust Act, enacted Oct. 24, 1984, 47 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 753 (Oct. 25, 1984); see id. at 716-18, 737 (Oct. 18, 1984).
339. See supra notes 312-25 and accompanying texL




343. See supra notes 301-09 and accompanying text.
344. See Robinson, supra note 15, at 137.
345. See Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 33-40.
346. Tiebout, supra note 264, at 416; see Robinson, supra note 15, at 149-52.
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in competition with each other, and that each consumer-voter votes with
his feet by choosing to reside in the community that offers the most desir-
able tax/expenditure combination.347 Easterbrook argues that competi-
tion among government entities, both states and municipalities, restrains
these entities from engaging in anticompetitive conduct. 348 Further, this
competition increases as the amount of autonomy possessed by local gov-
ernmental units increases. 34 9 By reducing autonomy, the current state
action doctrine impedes competition and injures consumers.350
Easterbrook's observation is valuable, but I do not believe that compe-
tition among municipalities is alone sufficient to justify immunity. His
theory does not consider the possibility of collusion among governmental
units. Further, though competition among cities might constitute a long-
run and substantially adequate solution to an assumed problem of re-
straints of trade imposed by a municipality, it would not appear to be a
short-run or complete answer. People are not completely mobile, nor is
there an infinite number of tax/expenditure options. Injury to consumer
welfare is possible despite competition among governments. 351
Easterbrook's point does demonstrate that the amount of harm any
municipality can do is limited. This realization is crucial in order to ac-
quire the perspective necessary to discern the optimal solution to the
problem of municipal liability. It does not, however, resolve the problem.
Thus, though we reach similar destinations, we travel different paths.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with an analysis of the state action doctrine as it
exists today. States are absolutely immune from antitrust attack; a pri-
vate party participating in the state action will be immunized either if the
related conduct of the state is deemed the proximate cause of the anti-
trust injury, or if the private actions are properly authorized and super-
vised by the state. A municipality is immune from antitrust attack only if
its challenged actions are consistent with a clear state policy. Thus, it is
not enough that the city is acting within the scope of general authority
delegated by the state. A United States Court of Appeals has held that
the active supervision requirement does not apply to municipalities, but
the better view is that if it is applied to private parties, it should be ap-
plied to cities.
There are strong reasons why governments at whatever level should be
347. Of course, the model is far more sophisticated than this statement suggests. For a
lucid explanation of the theory and summary of some of the literature that has been
devoted to it, see W. Neenan, supra note 248, at 59-67.
348. See Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 36-40.
349. See id.
350. Id. at 40.
351. See T. Brennan, Municipal Antitrust Liability-An Economic Perspective 15
n.21 (Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper, Antitrust Div., Dept. of Justice, EPO 83-
9, May 26, 1983).
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free from antitrust challenge. The antitrust laws are intended to promote
consumer welfare by protecting competition. Cities, as well as other gov-
ernmental entities, may act in any of four ways that affect competition: to
foster competition, cure market defects, promote a value other than com-
petition, or generate monopoly profits. If they act to foster competition,
their actions directly complement the antitrust laws. If they act to cure
market defects, they act specifically to undermine competition, but in a
way that increases consumer welfare. If they act to promote a value other
than efficiency, they may or may not incidentally sacrifice consumer wel-
fare. If they act to generate monopoly profits, they intentionally sacrifice
consumer welfare for the personal gain of city officials, the benefit of pri-
vate parties, or the benefit of the public treasury through an inefficient
form of taxation.
Whatever injury to consumer welfare a city might do as a by-product
of promoting another value or as the result of conduct intended to impair
efficiency, antitrust liability is an inappropriate response. People, acting
through their government, have a right to sacrifice their welfare as con-
sumers for any reason or for no reason at all, as long as they bear the
costs. The antitrust laws should not be used to deny them that right.
Further, antitrust courts cannot be expected to distinguish between mu-
nicipal actions that injure consumer welfare and those that do not. If
they attempt to do so, the risk of erroneous liability is high, and the
consequent chilling effect on governmental action is significant. When
cities do act to impose a burden of inefficiency on nonresidents, they
should be restrained, but by available state and federal legal mandates
other than the antitrust laws.
Currently, municipalities can acquire immunity derivatively from
states, but this is not enough. Obtaining adequate state authorization is
expensive because of both the direct costs imposed upon cities and states
and the indirect costs engendered by the consequent reduction in local
autonomy. Conversely, there is no marginal benefit in recognizing deriva-
tive rather than independent immunity.
Thus, for purposes of antitrust immunity, municipalities should be
treated exactly like states: Municipalities should be immune from anti-
trust liability for their actions that proximately cause antitrust injury,
and they should be able to immunize such actions of agencies and private
parties. Congress has acted to shield municipalities from damages, but
this does not go far enough. If the Supreme Court is unwilling to turn
back from its present course and, for antitrust purposes, accord cities the
same status it has bestowed upon states, Congress ought to point out the
proper direction.
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